Now that Israel has assassinated Yahya Sinwar, the head of the political bureau of Hamas, will its far-right government stop war in Gaza? The killing of Sinwar was part of the goals it had set while declaring war on Gaza. It has been accusing him of planning and supervising Operation Flood of Al-Aqsa. Except for finding the remaining living Israeli prisoners in Gaza, Israel has exhausted all its goals in the war on the Gaza Strip, to the point that it is striking for the sake of destruction only. The other goals, such as eliminating Hamas completely, seem unrealistic due to the movement’s deep roots in the Strip and its widespread presence within the Gazan social structure.
The killing of Sinwar remained the main motive of the Israeli war. Under this cover, Netanyahu was confronting internal and external pressures. The end of the war with Sinwar still alive (in the view of Israeli leaders) would have made the war meaningless, and his continued leadership of Hamas would have allowed him to restore the movement’s power in a short time, thanks to his strong personality, the characteristics of a decisive political and field leader, and the legitimacy he possesses after leading the movement during the war.
Israel realises that Sinwar has a unique position in the history of the Palestinian struggle and the Arab resistance in general. This man has never known compromise and was not satisfied with anything less than liberating his homeland. He chose the most difficult paths and routes to reach his goal. He spent about half his life in prison, and was a tiring prisoner for his jailers, challenging them in their prison, challenging the legitimacy of their existence, belittling their strength, and promising them that one day he would come to uproot them with a flood that he would lead against them.
Sinwar was not a leader by his speeches, but rather a man of the ground. He was decisive in his decisions. This was evident through his changing the nature of the work of the movement’s security apparatuses, which he led, and imposed his style and logic on the movement and its working mechanisms, and reshaping it according to his vision as a liberation movement in extremely complex circumstances. The field leaders of Hamas found in him a leader worthy of following because of his reliability, decisive ability, and determination. Israel understood this very well.
The goal of eliminating Sinwar and removing him from the leadership of Hamas was not merely to satisfy the feeling of revenge against Sinwar for leading Operation Flood of Al-Aqsa, which humiliated the Israeli army and its security services, but because it considered him the axis of the resistance movement in Gaza and Palestine. Therefore, removing him could destroy the dynamic which his presence and leadership of the movement had created.
This is very similar to Israel’s perceptions after the assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, with the difference that Sinwar leads Hamas alone, and the movement’s structure is simple and not as complex as that of Hezbollah.
In addition, the external influence is weaker in Hamas than in Hezbollah. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard, for example, cannot interfere in the Hamas’ mechanisms or policies, as it does with Hezbollah. Accordingly, the pressing question today is: Will Netanyahu make the decision to stop the war in Gaza, after achieving his goal of assassinating Sinwar?
[by Ghazi Dahman in Al-Araby Al-Jadeed]
Compiled and translated by Faizul Haque