Since the developments of October 7,2023, China did not take any unilateral position to pressure Israel, nor has it presented any proposals to the Security Council to stop the war like Russia, Brazil, and others did. It has been content with its general statements of support for international efforts.
This limitation prompted China to search for another way to stay alive in the conflict. After the failure of the Security in stopping the war, the most attractive issue was ending the Palestinian division. The inability to influence the course of the war, particularly stopping it, prompted Beijing to search for a sensitive and fundamental issue with regional and international dimension, such as Palestinian reconciliation. This was in pursuit of a role which would cover up its weak influence on the course of the war and its parties. This raises an important question: Is Chinese activity related to Palestinian reconciliation actually aimed at achieving it, or is it an adjustment in Chinese foreign policy after the failure of the approach of shifting responsibility, particularly since it demonstrated the actual limit of its influence, whether in the war or in international institutions?
Immediately after the announcement of the signing of the agreement on July 22 (by Palestinian factions), Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said that her country’s goal is “to reach consensus on governance in the post-conflict phase in Gaza, form a temporary national reconciliation government, and the strongest aspirations are to achieve a true independent state for Palestine.” China’s statements and its mediation between the factions also pose additional questions, some of which revolve around the centrality of ending the division to confront Israel. Many Palestinians will agree that Palestinian unity is the foundation for standing against the Israeli occupation. But many will disagree with the Chinese assessment that this unity is an obstacle to establishing a state, and ignoring other more important factors, particularly Israel. What is the Chinese wisdom in turning to this specific point, achieving internal Palestinian consensus? And why did Beijing not begin intervening in the conflict? For example, wouldn’t it have been better for China to implement its declared support for the Palestinians by putting real pressure on Israel? Or at least mediating between Palestine and Israel, or rather pressuring the latter? Or mediating between America and Israel on the one hand, and Palestine on the other hand, to establish the state, and not mediating between the factions? These reflections come with a big question in the background, if we assume for the sake of argument that the agreement succeeded and the interim government was formed, do the factions have the ability to stop the war and establish the Palestinian state, as China said? Why did China choose to resort to mediation between the Palestinian factions?
Regardless of China’s intentions and pragmatic goals, let us try to understand how the “Beijing Declaration” serves. First, it breaks the isolation imposed by Washington and the West on Hamas, and enhances its legitimacy as the de facto leader of the Palestinian resistance and an integral part of the Palestinian national movement. Second, it uses the remaining months before the US elections, to make the Palestinian Authority to warn the Biden administration that it will resort to other international parties competing with Washington. This policy has succeeded in the past, and it may achieve something today. Third, China’s focus on the Palestine creates massive international momentum and keeps Palestine in the forefront, particularly in light of the international preoccupation today with the US presidential elections. Fourth, the Palestinian factions can exploit China’s rapprochement with them and raise major issues. For example, they can ask China to stop its investments in Israeli settlements.
[by RazanShawamreh in Al Araby Al Jadeed]
Compiled and translated by FaizulHaque