The Israeli government announced the mobilization of two of its reserve brigades to the northern front. Talk about the ground invasion takes us back to 2006, or the 2006 syndrome as it can be called. Israel realizes that it possesses a powerful air force, and if it has been satisfied with that, it would have undoubtedly been the victor, but its defeat was due to the ground incursion at that time.
If Israel wants to break this predicament, it must have another situation, particularly since it is waging another war on the Gaza Strip. This shows that the previous circumstances are not at all similar to the current circumstances. Hezbollah’s capabilities have changed since 2006 until today, as have Israel’s capabilities, by the way.
Therefore, the real dilemma lies in the fact that Israel does not know Hezbollah’s capabilities specifically. It has not fought a war with it for years. Therefore, everything Israel is doing now can be said to be merely testing the waters or as close as possible to an assessment of what Hezbollah has and can do if it escalates the confrontation to a second stage, and the extent of its tolerance if it fights a war at higher levels.
Between the war on Gaza and Lebanon, we must stop at an important point, which is that we cannot measure all the developments on the northern front by what Israel did in the Gaza Strip at the beginning of the war. The capabilities and situations are different. When Israel entered the Gaza Strip, it was in a state of confusion, a state of uncertainty, but now it has arrangements. It has takeninto account all expectations from the best to the worst about everything which will happen if it pulls the trigger of war! It is important to realize that there has been a premeditated vendetta between Israel and Hezbollah since 2006. If we go back to October 7 and ask why Israel went to war, the answer will be that it was stabbed in the most important flank, which is the prestige of military deterrence. Therefore, it needs to restore its prestige, particularly since it has an old vendetta with Hezbollah. Therefore, the political vision is in line with the military goals.
The most important question in this context is what is the amount of victory for Israel in the war on Lebanon? When answering, a point of difference and contrast appears. Some see that the main goal is to remove Hezbollah’s position beyond the Litani river. There are those who see the victory in overthrowing Hezbollah and ending its presence. There are also those who see that victory is in actual settlement in southern Lebanon. This brings us back to the basic project of Ben Gvir and Smotrich, which is settlement, and for this reason there is no clear measure or definition of victory.
There is a clear discrepancy on the diplomatic pitch, even among the Israeli opposition. The Israeli opposition acknowledges that entering the diplomatic track can only happen after showing strength, an example of which is Israel’s experience with Egypt in 1982 and the Camp David Accords. However, it cannot be used as a benchmark. The reason is that it was dealing with a state, but now it is dealing with organizations which it describes as terrorists. It cannot deal in the same way it dealt with a state like Egypt. The big question remains, what does Netanyahu want? Does he want, for example, to return the residents to the north? Has he been able to retrieve its prisoners from the Gaza Strip despite his complete control over it?! So, what is he seeking, particularly on the Lebanese front? Does he want to pass this issue with all its complexities onto the Israeli street and to whoever will inherit power after him? Or does he aspire through this to compromise and trade-offs in the negotiating table?!
[by Ehab Jabareen in Al Jazeera]
Compiled and translated by Faizul Haque