The Arabs committed four major mistakes while handling the conflict in Syria. The first mistake of the Arab countries was that they were unable, at the beginning of the war, to formulate a unified and coherent strategy to support the revolution to overthrow Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
Their second mistake was that some countries, which had provided strong political and military support to the opposition, retreated from continuing this support and abandoned the objective of overthrowing Assad. This withdrawal placed the Arabs on the sidelines in the conflict and paved the way for Russia and Iran to reverse the course of the war.
The third mistake committed by them was that the Arabs did not attach importance to align their Syrian interests with Türkiye, which after the middle of the last decade was able to strengthen its strong presence in Syria and became effectively the only country preventing the complete liquidation of the Syrian issue.
The fourth mistake committed by Arabs was the Arab League’s decision to restore Syria’s membership and the choice of some Arab countries to normalise their relations with Damascus.
The Arab world needs to play an influential role in Syria. It should not give way to other factors, which have exacerbated the Syrian collapse and made it a failed state. Such factors would destroy the present and future of the Syrians, and would also make Syria a destabilizer of regional security and an exporter of chaos in its Arab surroundings.
The push of some Arab countries towards Damascus in recent years appears to be an evolution in Arab politics in Syria.
However, it also appears that this supposed maturity still lacks a long-term strategic vision which could help transform the Arab role in Syria into a player which enhances the chances of restoring stability to this country.
This is due to two basic predicaments. The first is that this shift in Arab policies treats the success of the regime and its allies, in reversing the course of the war, in their favour. This is as a reality which can no longer be ignored.
The second is that the bets on which these policies are based are not only wrong, because they are based on providing incentives to Assad to convince him of the advantages of engaging in a political process with the opposition which leads to a radical solution to the conflict, but also because they feed the regime’s belief that it has won this war and therefore there is no reason for it to bring about any political change. The Arabs now treat it as if it has won the war.
The only way which can bring the Arabs back to Syria is through acknowledging the fact that Syria cannot come out of this war and recover from it quickly without achieving a political transition which meets the aspirations of the Syrians.
They should also exercise all available pressure options on Assad to force him to take this path instead of the policy of incentives which are counterproductive.
The Arabs should display openness for cooperation with Türkiye to create a coherent Turkish-Arab strategy capable of doubling the pressure on Assad and his allies to accept a real political solution and undermining Iran’s ability to continue to benefit from the vacuum of the Arab role in Syria.
[by Mahmoud Allouch in Syria TV]
Compiled and translated by Faizul Haque