One of Netanyahu’s justifications for permitting a ceasefire agreement with Lebanon was to break the so-called “unity of arenas” and isolate Hamas so that it would confront Israel alone. When the Hamas movement launched the attacks on October 7, 2023, the vision of its late leader Yahya Sinwar was that there would be a multi-front battle against Israel launched from Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, or the parties of the axis of resistance or defiance. The late Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, spoke, after the Hamas attacks, about the strategy of unity of arenas, and the coordination of the forces and militias of the axis of resistance in their operations against Israel to surround it with a ring of fire. Indeed, on October 8, 2023, Hezbollah, along with the Fajr Forces of the Lebanese Islamic Group and Palestinian factions operating from Lebanon, began engaging in operations against Israel which targeted military sites and settlements near the border by launching missiles and drones. The same thing happened, albeit at a lower rate, from the occupied Syrian Golan. Iraqi factions and militias also launched missiles at American bases in Iraq and Syria, as well as deep inside Israel. The Houthis in Yemen launched ballistic missiles and drones in addition to attacking ships heading to Israel via the Red Sea.
It seemed as if there were several fronts operating simultaneously against Israel. However, developments confirmed, as QassemQassir, a Lebanese researcher close to Hezbollah, said, the lack of coordination among these fronts. Each team had its own calculations, and there was no integration or prior agreement on joint action. With the exception of Hezbollah’s operations, the attacks by the Houthis, the Iraqi factions, or those operating in Syria did not cause serious damage to Israel. The goal was to show solidarity, not actual participation, as Iran, which sponsors and funds these factions, feared that actual participation would lead to the start of a major regional war in which America would enter alongside Israel, with dire consequences for Tehran and the axis of resistance.
There was also no popular support for the involvement of these forces in a war with Israel. Many political movements and parties in Lebanon strongly rejected Hezbollah’s participation and accused it of taking the state hostage and acting alone. The Iraqi government has confirmed that the state, not the factions, can take the decision of war and peace, and that support for the Palestinian cause comes through political support, condemnation, denunciation, and mediation. But the most important development which could practically overthrow the unity of the arenas is the ceasefire agreement in Lebanon, which imposes conditions on Hezbollah that make the resumption of operations against Israel almost impossible, at least in the foreseeable future. The attacks of other support fronts have declined sharply. Even if some of them continue to operate, their influence is almost non-existent. Some Arab governments are in their weakest state to the point that these forces and militias have taken away one of their most important powers, which is declaring war. The justification of these forces is that their governments have abandoned their commitments to the Joint Arab Defence Agreement signed in Alexandria in 1950, which considered any aggression against any Arab country as aggression against the rest of the countries. After the October 1973 War, the agreement was not implemented even once, whether during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, or the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Even Arab participation in the war to liberate Kuwait took place under the umbrella of the international coalition led by the United States.
[by Abdullah Abdussalam in Al-Masry Al-Youm]
Compiled and Translated by Faizul Haque