What happened on October 7 was an implementation of YahyaSinwar’s strategic vision for the conflict with Israel. He believes that the old pattern of action based on small operations does not lead to significant results for the Palestinian cause, and will not force Israel to implement international resolutions. What will achieve this is a major operation which forces Israel to yield and isolates it from the international community and weakens its global position. This means that Sinwar had an understanding of the scene post Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, as the man is known to be a realist and not a dreamer.
In any case, Israel is primarily responsible for the equations which have been formed in Gaza and all of Palestine on the one side, and one cannot blame a person or entity on the other. It was logical that the extremist elite which came to power in Israel through deliberate and systematic policies, humiliated the Palestinians and destroyed the fundamentals of their cause, would be met with extremism on the other side, which has become a Palestinian, Arab and Islamic requirement to protect what remains of Palestine, its people, its holy sites and its symbolism.
This was thought necessary in the face of explicit Israeli calls to accelerate the declaration of the Jewishness of Palestine, expel the Arabs from the West Bank, and demolish the Al-Aqsa Mosque. The fact is that Sinwar’s choice will have clear implications in managing the negotiations, and the area will have a major impact in determining the frameworks of any potential deal in the future.
Although Sinwar’s influence in this background was present, after he combined control over politics and the military, and his monopoly on leadership. It will seriously change the previous equation and affect Hamas’s options, such as the continuation of the resistance, until Israel’s surrender and Benjamin Netanyahu’s fall become imminent. Despite the difficulty of achieving this objective in light of the difference in the balance of power, Sinwar’s bets include some logic in light of the division in the Israeli elite, the fatigue of Israeli society, and Washington’s efforts to find a way out of the war in Gaza.
The selection of Sinwar as the movement’s leader may have effects on Hamas, which needs to deal flexibly and pragmatically with the changing strategic environment of the conflict. The movement needs regional political support and international acceptance.
Meanwhile, Sinwar, from his behaviour and policies, seems to be on the path of marginalising all other actors in the movement, and limiting their roles. It is not unlikely that he will change most of the known figures in Hamas in later stages, even if not by force, but by marginalising them and disrupting their effects. This leads us to ask about the extent of Iranian influence on the movement’s current and future path, as it seems that Hamas, after choosing Sinwar, has become more closely aligned with the Iranian axis.
This is a problem which will have consequences on Hamas and the Palestinian cause as a whole, as Israel, regardless of the party which rules it, will not hesitate to employ this fact against the interests of the Palestinians. Despite the weakness of the Arab framework, and even its failure to help the Palestinians, it remains less harmful than integrating the Palestinian issue within the Iranian geopolitical project, due to the regional and international problems it entails, and its negative impact on the Arab Levant.
[by Ghazi Dahman in Al-Araby Al-Jadeed]
Compiled and translated by FaizulHaque