Napoleon Bonaparte once said that “God is on the side of the heavy artillery”. However, the heavy artillery helped him naught in the decisive battle of the Waterloo. The war history, both modern and ancient, is filled with the instances when the mighty are humbled and the humbled are exalted. American defeat in Vietnam and the Soviet debacle in Afghanistan are the two glaring modern examples that the meek were triumphant and the magnificent had fallen from their high pedestals. It’s not the numerical superiority or heavy artillery that brings victory, it’s the fortitude to fight with defined purpose and objective that sets the struggle onto the victory path. Motivation and will power of the people resisting foreign invaders and fighting for their independence are stronger than the military might of the attackers; they may lose a battle here and there but win the war at the end of the day.
After toppling the Taliban regime in 2001 the U.S. and NATO forces lost the sense of purpose and direction in their fight in Afghanistan; their given raison d’etre is no longer there. A question is asked in the U.S., is this war worth fighting? Doubts are expressed by both military and civilian leaders about its conception, execution, and intents.
In his letter of resignation, Matthew Hoh, a former US Marine captain, who fought in Iraq and who subsequently served as a Political Officer in the Foreign Service and as Senior Civilian Representative for the U.S. Government in Zabul Province, writes: “I have lost understanding of and confidence in the strategic purposes of the United States’ presence in Afghanistan. I have doubts and reservations about our current strategy and planned future strategy, but my resignation is based not upon how we are pursuing this war, but why and to what end. To put simply: I fail to see the value or the worth in continued U.S. casualties or expenditures or resources in support of the Afghan government in what is, truly, a 35-year old civil war.” His words echo the sentiments of many in the U.S.
And in Afghanistan the presence of 40,000 U.S. soldiers and 70,000 NATO troops are seen by a large portion of Afghan population as invaders and occupiers and supporters of a corrupt government, not as liberators. Many Afghans make no difference between the current U.S. occupation and that of the past by the British in the 19th century or the Soviets three decades ago. Afghans know too well that the U.S. propped up the Karzai government, as the Soviets installed the “quisling regime of Babrak Karmal” (Reagan’s words), as tool of its policy.
It’s foolish to assume that all the resistance to the occupation is limited to a gruesome group the west conveniently labels as Taliban. The anti-occupation resistance is popular and countrywide. Lieutenant General Ali Mohammad Jan Orakzai, former governor of Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province, reportedly said about the resistance in Afghanistan, “It is developing into some sort of a nationalist movement, a resistance movement, a sort of liberation war against coalition forces.”
It’s for this reason that over 100,000 occupation soldiers with all the military might and the U.S. trained Afghan army together could not tame the rag tag soldiers of resistance. U.S. and Afghan army control less than 30 per cent of Afghanistan, whereas the anti-occupation forces are effectively ruling the three-fourth of the country. According to the International Council on Security and Development report, dated December 2008, the Taliban holds a permanent presence in 72% of Afghanistan, up from 54% a year ago. Within a year, the Taliban’s permanent presence in the country has increased by a startling 18%.” The report shows that that the Taliban has a significant presence in virtually all of Afghanistan. President Karzai wields little influence outside the capital and finds it hard to shed the moniker of “mayor of Kabul.”
Gen. Stanley McChrystal, top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, realising that U.S. troops are losing ground to Taliban, has asked for 40,000 more troops to head off a failure against Taliban militants. Would an additional 40,000 troops reverse the Taliban momentum, neutralise their gain, and turn the tide in the western forces’ favour. Don’t bet on it. A surge of 21,000 troops in March 2009 has not proven effective. The surge failed to contain insurgency that has spread from the southern and eastern Afghanistan to other parts of the country including the non-Pushtun areas and has taken a shape of national liberation war.
Defeating the Taliban is unlikely. They are not trained in classical war; their training is in asymmetric and guerrilla tactics. Their organisational structure is fluid and mobile. And most importantly, they are fighting in their own territory with the belief that it’s their sacred duty to expel the alien forces from their country. The U.S. has realised the impossible task of defeating Taliban. Accordingly, the strategy of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan is now redefined from trying to “defeat” to “degrading” the Taliban (Washington Post, December 7, 2009). Now the U.S. will focus that Taliban could no longer threaten the Afghan government’s survival. This also seems to be an unattainable goal. Once the western forces leave Afghanistan, the foreign-installed government, with all the borrowed military might, will not be able to withstand the insurgency and the country will sink into yet another chaos.
Afghan and U.S. officials estimate the number of Taliban fighters around 15,000. If more than 100,000 U.S. and NATO troops and 200,000 Afghan security forces together after eight years of fighting could not gain ground against the estimated 15,000 ill-equipped and ill-trained Taliban, why should we believe that an addition of 40,000 troops would turn the tide against the insurgency before the troops withdrawal start in 2011? The U.S.-led coalition has as many troops deployed in Afghanistan today as Soviet had during its occupation in 1980s. However, the Soviets and few before them have all failed in their attempts to subjugate Afghanistan. Afghanistan has not been too kind to invaders throughout the history.