A Tale of Two Spoilers

During the electioneering in all phases of the recent Bihar Assembly election, it was prominent that RJD leader Tejashwi Yadav appeared more confident, well-composed and crowd-catcher than leaders of all other parties. On the other hand, his opponent stalwarts appeared to be frustrated, sometimes losing their temper. However, the best performance in electioneering show could…

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M S Khan

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During the electioneering in all phases of the recent Bihar Assembly election, it was prominent that RJD leader Tejashwi Yadav appeared more confident, well-composed and crowd-catcher than leaders of all other parties. On the other hand, his opponent stalwarts appeared to be frustrated, sometimes losing their temper. However, the best performance in electioneering show could not fetch actual returns to MGB (Maha Gath Bandhan). Where did things go wrong?

The results indicate that all major parties have faltered in one way or the other, but the dynamics of contest exposes mainly two internal spoilers as well as deficient alliance stratagem of both political combinations. Let us try to understand the dynamics and stratagem deficiencies on the basis of facts having been exposed with the election results.

First of all, it is to be noted that AIMIM didn’t split Muslim vote, as was expected, in any of the 20 constituencies except Sherghati (Magadh zone) and even here it didn’t affect the winnability of RJD candidate. Out of 20 seats, AIMIM grabbed five seats and in the remaining 15 constituencies it could fetch only a minuscule of Muslim vote (0.25-11% of total votes cast in those constituencies). As such, AIMIM didn’t prove to be spoiler of Muslim vote.

Secondly, it appears that whereas Muslim vote split in only two constituencies due to fielding of independent Muslim candidate but without, a feeling of major split of Yadav vote prevails in at least 10 constituencies affecting the winnability of MGB candidates (Jale, Bisfi, Darbhanga, Gopalganj, Supaul, Keoti, Pranpur, Aurai, Dhaka and Brauli). And this happened after first phase of electioneering when employment agenda of Tejashwi was countered with communal discourse. These are the examples of micro level deviation in electoral dynamics adversely affecting MGB.

But the major  spoilers are two internal factors which affected the winnability of MGB and JDU-INC for the former and LJP for the latter. INC got an unmanageable huge share of 70 seats in MGB and got elected in only 19 constituencies, one-third less than what it got in 2015 election despite doubling its candidacy. If INC would have been content to 40 seats as of 2015 election, political combination of MGB might have been broadened to adjust HAMS, VIP and RLSP – all three parties had first tried to be part of MGB.

Extra 30 seats, given away to INC, caused the stratagem fault for MGB. If 50-60 seats would have been spared (30 of INC plus 20 of RJD) for the above three parties, it would have enabled the MGB to win in at least 40 additional constituencies, thus raising its tally to around 150 seats.

Second spoiler proved to be disastrous for JDU. LJP was demanding 40 seats which had to be spared mainly from BJP share of 121 seats including some seats from JDU. Neither JDU was ready to adjust with LJP as partner nor did it fit into the scheme of BJP. Rather, LJP was blessed to contest against JDU all over Bihar. It is evident that specific vote base of LJP is not so broad that it can fight against JDU all over Bihar. However, LJP’s declared stand to spoil the winnability of JDU and overt allegiance to BJP disseminated a message to BJP voters that the JDU had to be cut to size. Despite half-hearted damage control measures after first phase of electioneering, LJP had already spread the message that it was blessed with the mission to cut JDU to size and thus LJP succeeded in inflicting heavy loss to JDU by splitting a sizeable chunk of the NDA vote bank. It is interesting to note that in two to three constituencies, this drifting of votes was managed in favour of even an independent candidate to damage JDU winnability. It was found in a few constituencies (like Thakurganj).

The above facts only describe the ifs and buts of Bihar Assembly Election 2020. But three prominent features of the recent Bihar election are also worth mentioning: (1) it established the maturity of Tejashwi leadership and his capability of mass appeal with developmental agenda without any caste overtones, (2) NDA failed to catch mass expectation with any positive roadmap and still dependent on harping on unsubstantiated chorus of jungle raj or resorting to communal discourse; and no doubt it works even among those people who are passing through the distress of unemployment and economic hardships, and (3) MGB has to broaden its alliance for better electoral prospect in future by including smaller caste-based political groups in Bihar.

Despite several challenges from within and from without, Nitish Kumar performed well, no doubt by getting a sizeable chunk of BJP vote bank, but it slid down from 71 to 43. Whereas BJP benefited more from JDU vote base which raised its tally from 53 in 2015 to 74 in the recent election. However, due to failure of half-baked scheme of sidelining  JDU, now BJP appears to be more in need of Nitish Kumar face than the JDU to remain in power, at least till the next parliamentary election.