Expanding the Abraham Accords is no longer merely a diplomatic objective for US President Donald Trump’s administration. It has become a test of the limits of American influence in the Middle East and Washington’s ability to reshape its regional relationships amid the Gaza war, tensions with Iran and shifting American political dynamics.
Trump has viewed Arab-Israeli normalisation as a gateway to building a regional framework based on expanding security and economic cooperation and countering Iranian influence, while also opening up opportunities for investment, technology and energy. However, the Gaza war has brought the Palestinian issue back to the forefront of Arab calculations, increasing the political cost of any rapprochement with Israel that is not accompanied by progress towards a settlement.
The results of the US midterm elections, held on Nov. 3, have introduced another factor, with Democrats securing control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. This does not mean an immediate decline in Washington’s support for Israel. However, it places the Trump administration in a more complicated political environment and gives the opposition broader tools to scrutinise foreign policy and debate its costs.
Since returning to the White House, Trump has sought to revive the momentum surrounding the Abraham Accords, which included the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco, alongside Sudan’s stalled normalisation process. In May 2026, he invited Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Türkiye, Egypt and Jordan to join the accords, in the context of discussions about a comprehensive agreement with Tehran.
This reflects Washington’s desire to transform normalisation into part of a broader regional arrangement. However, the countries concerned do not consider confrontation with Iran sufficient justification for overlooking Palestinian differences or ignoring the consequences of Israeli policies.
Saudi Arabia appears to be the most prominent case. Despite its political, economic and religious weight, the kingdom continues to link the establishment of formal relations with Israel to a serious pathway towards the creation of a Palestinian state. Last August, Trump linked the implementation of a proposed civilian nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia to the kingdom joining the Abraham Accords.
Riyadh understands that the value of normalisation cannot be measured solely by the benefits it might secure from the United States, but also by its implications for Saudi Arabia’s regional position.
One of the most significant obstacles is that the Gaza war has reshaped the Arab political environment. After years of Washington attempting to separate normalisation from a Palestinian settlement, it has become increasingly difficult to treat the two as separate tracks.
The continuing disagreements over Gaza’s future, the presence of Israeli forces, the situation in the West Bank and the Israeli government’s rejection of Palestinian statehood make it difficult to present normalisation as a gateway to regional stability.
The dilemma becomes even more complicated amid regional tensions. Israel is no longer viewed by Arab countries merely as a potential partner in confronting Iran. Its military policies and expanding operations have themselves become part of regional threat assessments.
Here lies the contradiction at the heart of the American project: the wider the confrontation with Iran becomes, the greater Washington’s need for regional security cooperation. Yet Israeli military operations may make Arab countries more cautious about associating themselves with a regional framework led by Israel.
The elections affect Trump’s ability to manage the normalisation process, rather than necessarily changing the fundamental American position on Israel. Security and military support for Israel continues to enjoy broad backing across both parties.However, Democrats’ control of both the houses gives the opposition greater influence over oversight, investigations, budgets, funding, foreign policy legislation and the confirmation of appointments.
This could push Trump to exercise greater caution in presenting normalisation as a standalone achievement, particularly when it involves financial or security commitments or requires congressional approval for strategic agreements.Saudi Arabia remains the most important player in Washington’s calculations.
[Al-Arab]
Compiled and translated by Faizul Haque