Autonomy for Moros Promises and Pitfalls

Philippines has set aside certain areas in Mindanao as a special autonomous region for Moro Muslims, but some believe it will not help resolve the decades-old conflict as martial law and repressive measures against the Moro people continue. Syed Khalid Husain analyses the latest development.

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SYED KHALID HUSAIN

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South-east Asia Correspondent

Philippines has set aside certain areas in Mindanao as a special autonomous region for Moro Muslims, but some believe it will not help resolve the decades-old conflict as martial law and repressive measures against the Moro people continue. Syed Khalid Husain analyses the latest development.

The five-decade-old Muslim insurgency on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao is expected to eventually come to an end with the recent enactment by the Philippine government of a law that allows an expanded and more powerful, locally governed region for Muslims on the island.

Philippines gross regional domestic product

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte this month signed the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), previously known as the Bangsamoro Basic Law, marking a historic step towards the creation of Bangsamoro, a Muslim-majority sub-state entity within the Catholic-majority country.

Officially called the Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, this piece of legislation creates a new entity called the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, which will replace the existing Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), a largely failed earlier experiment at granting autonomy to relatively few Muslim-majority regions.

The Bangsamoro law is a product of a 2014 peace agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Bangsamoro, or Moro people, are a group of Muslims within the ethnic indigenous tribes in South-east Asia. They form the largest non-Catholic group in the Philippines, comprising about 11 per cent of this South-east Asian nation’s 103 million population.

Once a dominant group in the Philippines, Moro Muslims have 500 years’ political history. The spread of Islam in the Philippines began in the 14th century, mostly by Muslim merchants from the western part of the Malay Archipelago. The Philippines was colonised by Spain in 1521. In 1898, Spain sold the entire archipelago to the United States for US$20 million.

The armed separatist movement on Mindanao, the Philippines’ second-largest island, began in 1969 as the Muslim-majority region sought to break away from the Christian-majority country. The conflict has so far claimed 120,000 lives.

After a long-drawn out liberation struggle, first led by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and later by the MILF, the Moros are now the closest they have been to achieving their long-sought autonomy, though still within the framework of the Philippine constitution.

The BOL is part of an agreement negotiated with the MILF and was originally part of a 2014 peace agreement under a previous administration, which was delayed following violence during the negotiation process. Mr Duterte, who was elected three years ago as the first Philippine president from Mindanao, has all along pushed for greater autonomy and respect for Muslims, who are among his most loyal constituents. He now hopes the conflict will be brought to an end by the passage of the new law.

The MILF has welcomed the deal. Its Chairman Ebrahim Murad said he was confident the law would help bring splinter separatist groups back into the political fold and eliminate prospects of any incidents like Marawi. “All these splinter groups are a result of the frustration with the peace process. The moment the small groups no longer accept the foreign elements, they can no longer come (to the Philippines).”

Meanwhile, the group’s chief negotiator, Mr Mohaqher Iqbal, warned: “We will not stop there, we will continue to engage government until amendments are made in the law later to get what we really wanted.”

SELF-GOVERNANCE AND FISCAL AUTONOMY

This new piece of legislation sets the Muslim-majority region of Bangsamoro aside as a special autonomous region of Mindanao. Under the law, the Bangsamoro region will have its own unique domestic legislation, likely a parliament, and a plethora of distinct administrative systems, including the creation of Shari’ah (Islamic law) courts.

The autonomous Muslim region will be headed by a chief minister and two deputy ministers, to be elected from the parliament – 50 per cent of which will be composed of political party representatives, 40 per cent parliamentary district representatives and 10 per cent sectoral representatives and reserved seats for non-Moro indigenous peoples and settler communities.

All parliament members will serve for a term of three years and for a maximum of three consecutive terms. The parliament will be empowered, among other things, to enact its own laws, among 55 other enumeration of powers, which Philippine Senate minority leader Franklin Drilon said is proof of self-governance.

Under a wealth-sharing arrangement between the federal government and the proposed Bangsamoro entity, only a quarter of locally generated taxes will be remitted back to the national government. The Bangsamoro will also be guaranteed an annual block grant of up to a 5 per cent share of the entire national revenue, amounting to just over US$1billion annually.

The new autonomy law also provides for the demobilisation of tens of thousands of Moro rebels, as both sides hope to end a war that has ravaged Mindanao. Both the Philippine government and the MILF agree that economic development will be an effective way to combat radicalisation and hence the new law could be a step in the right direction.

Many people say this is the Philippines’ best chance at staunching the wounds of a religious divide that has haunted the fertile and beautiful island of Mindanao for centuries. Yet, the path ahead remains bumpy and uncertain as residents of Muslim-populated regions in Mindanao are yet to approve the creation of a Bangsamoro in a plebiscite later this year.

The law has also been met with scepticism by Moro activists and reticence by some MNLF leaders, who fear a loss of power and prestige to their rivals under the new regime. The biggest challenge is for the MILF and other regional leaders to transition from weary rebels into a competent and progressive ruling class capable of addressing the most fundamental needs of the Moro people.

Some critics may even question the law’s constitutionality on the grounds that it could undermine the Philippines’ internal coherence and territorial integrity.

Jerome Aladdin Succor Aba, a Muslim activist and national chair of Suara Bangsamoro (Voice of the Moro), believes that the signing of the BOL will not help resolve the decades-old conflict in the Bangsamoro areas but will only enhance the national government’s control on resources and territories as the Duterte administration continues martial law and other repressive measures against the Moro people.

He says Congress’s belated passage of the law only shows how Congress and Senate can hold hostage the outcome of the peace process. “It’s as if only the recognition of Bangsamoro, in name, was achieved in this law,” he remarks.

“The national government continues to be more powerful over the new Bangsamoro government as seen in the increased number of reserved powers and concurrent powers/shared powers especially on matters involving resources, defence and public order and safety.”

BOL for the ARMM provisions on resources will facilitate the sell-out of Bangsamoro resources because it follows the national economic goals “which is liberalising our assets and wholesale selling of all our natural resources and it allows the foreign intervention in the development of resources,” Mr Aba claims.

The MILF’s admission that BOL was not a perfect law also opens the floodgates of doubts and disunity among the Moro people – some saying less was gained compared to previous agreement with the MNLF, he says. Worse, Mr Duterte’s plan for charter change and federalism further divides the Moro people as they question the place and validity of the BOL once federalism will come in, he concludes.

[The writer can be reached at [email protected]]