Ruhollah Khomeini laid the foundations of a different approach as he built the Islamic Republic in a world governed by the Soviet-American binary. He raised the slogan “Neither East nor West” and declared, “We are working to export our revolution to all parts of the world.”
Under later regional and international conditions, Iranian influence reached Lebanon in the 1980s, then Syria. Relations were built with Palestinian factions, and later extended to Iraq after 2003, and then to Yemen. Iranian officials were later quoted as saying, “Tehran controls four Arab capitals.”
Today, the landscape that was once defined by wide Iranian expansion appears to have changed, making any external strike or internal shock far more consequential than before.
For its part, Tehran says that a policy of good-neighbourly relations is an inherent, not tactical, element of its foreign policy, and that it maintains strategic alliances with Eastern powers, particularly Russia and China. But countries of the region, even when they hear this language, do not treat it in isolation from the realities of the past; they want guarantees of stability, not slogans.
The countries of the region understand that the regional and international order is being redrawn. They insist that any “new Middle East” cannot come at the expense of their security.
In this context, Israel’s expansion and the Abraham Accords are recalled as a reminder of the “periphery alliance” of the 1960s – an alliance that was informal yet effective, bringing together Pahlavi-era Iran, Türkiye, Ethiopia, and other smaller states. Its aim was to exert strategic pressure on Arab states hostile to Israel by confronting Arab nationalist regimes, securing strategic supply lines, and coordinating with Western powers.
Despite all this, Tehran does not appear to have sunk completely into regional and international crises, even if it has been “soaked to the bone,” as regional repercussions intersect with domestic anger.
Economic and living conditions have deteriorated, while protests have intensified and grown closer together in time. A broad segment of Iranians now believe that mismanagement and corruption are the primary causes of the economic crisis, not sanctions alone.
The weaker the social contract becomes, the more effective external pressure grows; and the higher external tensions rise, the more fragile the domestic front becomes.
The authorities are aware of this, which is why the Supreme Leader (Ali Khamenaei) has called on the Iranian president and the heads of the branches of government to double their efforts. In a description that captures the scale of the entanglement, former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami said: “Iran today stands at the heart of a serious crisis with interlocking dimensions that include economic, social, political, cultural, international, and security aspects.”
Externally, amid open-ended scenarios, former Iranian diplomat Hossein Mousavian wrote on his account on X: “The current return of relative calm represents an opportunity for the Iranian government to take substantive steps to resolve structural problems and improve governance, including improving economic conditions in the country, eradicating poverty, corruption, and unemployment, and sidelining incompetent or overly influential managers…
Tensions in relations with the United States remain the greatest challenge facing Iran’s foreign policy and its national security…
Diplomacy is the only path to peace. Washington and Tehran need direct, serious, and comprehensive dialogue, provided that the outcome is honourable for both capitals.
There is an inflamed interior which never truly cools, and an alert exterior which keeps raising the ceiling. Between them lies a zone walking along a razor-thin edge – one push may be enough to set the fireball rolling. [by Hazem Kallass in Alaraby]
Compiled and translated by Faizul Haque