It was expected that Egypt would join the Gulf front to confront Iran and its proxies in Iraq and Yemen. Such a move is essential to maintaining the regional balance of power, including for Egypt itself.
Now that Cairo has announced its readiness to participate, we can expect this official Egyptian position to face scepticism and criticism from various hostile and doubtful quarters. Why did Cairo not join the fight ten months ago? Is its position linked to the Saudi financial deposit? Or is it merely making verbal promises?
But Cairo, though it actually did not want to do so, has become a party to the war. This is because, it has been directly targeted by projectiles. Even before that, Iran-backed groups in Yemen and Iraq had also openly threatened it.
For the last three years, Egypt has been paying the price of Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping losing foreign-currency revenues. The economic cost has exceeded the combined implications of the wars in Libya, Sudan and Gaza. According to international estimates, Cairo is losing approximately six billion dollars annually in Suez Canal revenues.
The Egyptian economy now faces its gravest threat from the potential impact of the war on Egyptians working in the Gulf. More than five million Egyptians work in five Gulf countries, and their jobs and incomes could be disrupted if the war continues and these countries’ oil and gas exports decline.
Under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s leadership, Cairo has never been particularly enthusiastic about going to war. Yet these Gulf wars have placed Egypt on the front line without its choosing. The challenge extends beyond economic dangers and the threat to the livelihoods of millions of Egyptians. Iran’s emergence as a dominant power in the Gulf would diminish Egypt’s influence and threaten its national security.
After the Muslim Brotherhood came to power, Cairo also became an arena for an undeclared confrontation between Gulf governments and the Iranian regime. At the time, Tehran sought, through a series of moves, to support the Muslim Brotherhood and strengthen its control over the Egyptian state.
President Sisi’s declaration of readiness to enter the war sends a clear message to Tehran, which has benefited from divisions among the Gulf states and the absence of Arab support, leaving the Gulf fragmented and isolated.
As for why Egypt is making its move now rather than months ago, there may be understandable considerations behind the timing. These could include allowing time for negotiations and reconciliation, as well as avoiding the appearance of joining a unified front alongside Washington against Iran.
Some want to reduce Cairo’s motivations to financial compensation. But the equation goes far beyond that. Iran’s rise would come at Egypt’s expense, and Cairo is acting to defend its interests, influence and economy. Tehran could once again interfere in Egypt’s internal affairs and destabilise the country, as it has done in the past.
Egypt is also defending its economic security. Losses to the Suez Canal caused by the Houthis and Iran amount to approximately six billion dollars annually. Over three years, the targeting of shipping and the resulting reluctance of vessels to transit the canal have cost Egypt around eighteen billion dollars. Beyond the canal’s losses, the war threatens the livelihoods of millions of Egyptians living and working in the Gulf.
One final question remains: will Egypt’s participation change the military balance on the ground? That will depend on the nature and scale of its involvement, details of which we are still waiting to see.
Politically, Cairo is sending a message to Iran and the Arab world: it is no longer possible for it to remain silent in the face of Iran’s war against the Gulf.
[by Abdulrahman Al-Rashed in Asharq Al-Awsat]
Compiled and translated by Faizul Haque