On the occasion of the visit of Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Chairman of Sudan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council, the Egyptian presidency announced, in a statement, “that there are red lines that cannot be allowed to be crossed or treated lightly,” because doing so would affect Egyptian national security, “which is directly linked to Sudanese national security.”
The statement considered the preservation of Sudan’s unity to be among the most important of these red lines, and affirmed that Egypt will not allow “the secession of any part of Sudan’s territory,” and its “categorical rejection of the establishment of any parallel entities or the recognition of them,” adding that preserving Sudanese state institutions “is another red line for Egypt.”
The presidency’s statement did not stop at announcing the “red lines,” but added warnings about taking “all necessary measures and procedures guaranteed by international law and the joint defence agreement with Sudan to ensure that these red lines are not violated or crossed.”
At the same time, those forces, which control the five Darfur states in the west of the country (with the exception of parts of North Darfur), were continuing their clashes with the Sudanese army and its allied militias in the Kordofan region states. Their latest prize was seizing control of the Heglig oil field, the largest in the country; they were attacking electricity generation stations in more than one city, leading to blackouts in several states; and they were continuing their horrific violations against Sudanese civilians. According to the latest statistics of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, published yesterday (December 18), one such incident led to the death of more than one thousand people during an attack carried out by the Rapid Support Forces in April of last year on the Zamzam refugee camp, in addition to “massacres, rapes, other acts of sexual violence, torture, and abductions.”
In any case, the latest statement reflects growing concern within the Egyptian government over the expansion of the Rapid Support Forces’ control, their continuous advance, and the regional repercussions resulting from these attacks, as well as efforts to establish a parallel government and institutions in a way that would transform the military conflict into practical arrangements for secession. This is something we are witnessing a mirror image of in Yemen, following the similar major push carried out by the Transitional Council, through which it took control of the governorates of Hadramawt and al-Mahra, as well as their main oil sites.
The escalation by the Rapid Support Forces does not appear to be directed solely against the Sovereignty Council and its Egyptian ally, but also represents a response to statements made by U.S. President Donald Trump after his meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the White House. This explains the reference in the Egyptian presidential statement to Egypt’s keenness on continuing to operate within the framework of the “international quartet,” which includes Saudi Arabia, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates – the main sponsor of the Rapid Support Forces.
In fact, this reference to the “quartet” draws attention to the role of Abu Dhabi, which cannot be bypassed. At the same time, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the advance of the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan (as well as the Transitional Council in Yemen) would not have been possible without the military, financial, and political support provided by the UAE – a support that strongly worded statements, threats, and warnings about crossing “red lines” do not seem capable of stopping.
[Al-Quds Al-Arabi]
Compiled and translated by Faizul Haque