The stability of the Middle East region remains elusive as the powers of the region will continue their enduring efforts to challenge the foundations of the political society in the region. These powers have prevailed almost since the end of World War I. These states and their regimes are clinging to defend the status quo, mostly supported by the United States and European powers. They still believe that their interests require protecting the existing situation in the region and defending their “stability.” This is even if this stability is limited to security or repressive ideas.
Therefore, the Syrian transition will not be a linear process which proceeds without obstacles or challenges. For the Arab world, Syria represents a special geopolitical importance in the region which is perhaps only matched by Egypt. It is the same popular and moral weight which Syria has enjoyed in the Arab world since the formation of the Arab regional order. Therefore, the success of its revolution has regional, popular and political consequences which will not stop at Syria’s geographic borders.
The victory of the opposition has a disturbing message to the Arab regional order, which is that the current regional situation is still extremely fragile, in addition to being rejected by the revolutionary forces which have not yet surrendered. “Deterrence of aggression” (as the latest campaign of Syrian revolution was named by the opposition groups) intersects with “Al-Aqsa Flood” strategically, to confirm that the region will not witness stability soon, unless the causes of its prolonged turmoil are addressed.
The “deterrence of aggression” revealed the weakness of the Iranian influence regionally. While the Turkish move in Syria sends a message that Ankara is ready to fill the vacuum left by Iran regionally.
The Syrian transition path faces internal challenges in three areas. First, the extent of the opposition’s success in maintaining the unity of its position, coordination, and distribution of roles among themselves. Second is their capability of containing the likely disparity between the victorious opposition in Damascus and the Kurdish groups. Third is tightening control over the old ruling institutions and ensuring that they do not hinder the process of building a new system.
Externally, the most prominent challenges are the positions of those who have been supporting the Bashar Al-Assad regime including Russia and Iran. While Russia’s chances seem better as the new regime needs a wide margin to benefit from the divergence of interests of international powers. Iran’s options seem more complex.
Despite the positive positions expressed by the United States, it is too early to confirm its openness to the new Syria.
The steps of the new leaders in Damascus will proceed in a regional environment dominated by hostility. Except for Türkiye and Qatar, the influential countries in the region view the new regime as the result of two main threats: the Arab revolutions and the Islamists. This view will likely unify the positions of regional powers, some of which are expected to work in a consistent manner together to abort the new rule in Damascus.
The Syrian transition will not be a linear process without obstacles, due to the geopolitical importance of Damascus. Just as Syria was, and likely will remain, an arena for conflict between competing countries, it is now likely to see a proxy conflict between the popular forces of change in the region and the official Arab regional order.
[Arabic Post]
Compiled and translated by Faizul Haque