Gaza and Türkiye-Egypt Rapprochement

There are challenges facing the acceleration of the Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement and its impact on stopping the Gaza war. The economic factor alone is not enough to create a strategic partnership between Egypt and Türkiye. There must be political rapprochement between the two countries to cooperate in the implementation of the regional policies which protect the…

Written by

Faizul Haque

Published on

Despite the intense symbolisms and positive signals which surrounded the visit of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Egypt in the middle of this month (February), its initial outcomes may remain limited to the framework of bilateral relations between the two countries. The visit did not constitute a radical shift in the course of Arab policies or regional interactions, particularly towards the current Israeli war of annihilation on the Gaza Strip. Gaza is a decisive test of the actors in the Middle East particularly Egypt, Türkiye, and Iran, and the extent of their ability to curb Israel. Israel is displaying its unruly behaviour in Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria, and would do so in the foreseeable future.

There are challenges facing the acceleration of the Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement and its impact on stopping the Gaza war. The economic factor alone is not enough to create a strategic partnership between Egypt and Türkiye. There must be political rapprochement between the two countries to cooperate in the implementation of the regional policies which protect the interests of the peoples of the region.

The “fall” of President Erdogan’s leadership, as perceived by many, including several Turkish opposition parties, is also a challenge. The former Prime Minister and leader of the Future Party, Ahmet Davutoglu has criticized Erdogan’s visit to Egypt and his meeting with (Abdul Fattah) Al-Sisi, “who destroyed democracy in his country.” Ankara, in the eyes of many, has shown reluctance in imposing sanctions on Israel, being satisfied with passionate speeches, and the ambiguity of the idea of “guarantor states.”

Egypt and Türkiye have a regional vision on how to reduce the international influence which exploits Middle East conflicts, and enhance “regional independence” in finding solutions to these conflicts, through Arab-Turkish-Iranian cooperation, while developing a regional consensual/integrative vision to isolate and pressure Israel. They also want to do so by stopping all levels of normalization with Israel, and supporting global civil efforts to boycott and reject it. Both Türkiye and Egypt are keen to develop an effective regional strategy to support the resistance and steadfastness of the Palestinian people on their land.

There is also need for the Palestinian resistance factions, particularly the Hamas movement, to get rid of the delusions of betting on outside, international and regional powers for achieving Palestinian objectives, and to rely on themselves, their society and their people only.

Two things remain to be emphasized. One of them is that the Turkish-Egyptian rapprochement is a convergence of the need, administered by international and regional variables, after both sides paid the price of engaging in a regional conflict (as was evident in Libya in particular).

The other is that the issue of Palestine and the Palestinian forces need to reposition themselves, Palestinian, Arab, regional and international, to face the challenges of the next stage, and to think about how to form a global official and civil coalition, for the sake of Palestine, perhaps waiting for the outbreak of new popular uprisings which will change the balance of power in the region, in the interest of the cause of Palestine and the bereaved Arab peoples.

[by Amjad Ahmed Jibril in Al-Araby Al-Jadeed]

Compiled and translated by Faizul Haque