Taliban’s Advancement in Afghanistan: What, Who, Why and How
The US started negotiating indirectly with Taliban in 2011. After two years of these contacts, it allowed Taliban to open a representative office in Doha. The US-Taliban agreement was ready in late 2019. President Donald Trump was ready to invite a Taliban delegation to the White House if there had not been any internal opposition. Somehow, the agreement was signed on February 29, 2020. But the text of the agreement was not made public.
It is clear that the agreement does not prevent Taliban from moving ahead to seize areas which were not under its control. It did it without any US resentment or criticism. It raised a torrent of questions in Kabul, NATO allies, regional forces and even in Washington: Would the US withdrawal end the Afghan war or spread chaos and ignite civil wars? Were there secret understandings between the US and Taliban outside the text of the agreement? Why does Washington appear as if it has abandoned the Kabul government and does not mind Taliban’s restoration of its control over Afghanistan? However, has the Taliban changed from what it was in 2001 when it was classified as a terrorist organisation and its regime was overthrown, and has it abandoned its puritanical ideology and practices in governance? Has Taliban changed from what it was in 2001 when it was declared a terrorist organisation and its regime was toppled? Did it give up its fanaticism?
(by Abdulwahab Badrakhan in Al Ittihad, UAE)
There are swift developments taking place in Afghanistan following massive attacks carried out by Taliban. It is now controlling most (85 per cent) of the Afghan territories and has arrived to the outskirts of the capital, Kabul (30 km to the east). This has constituted a real challenge to the Iranian regime. It is a threat coming from its eastern borders. This is how the US administration has turned Afghanistan into a blazing fireball and threw it on the Iranians to engage them from the east.
Since the beginning of the US-Taliban dialogue, Tehran has tried to expand its sphere of influence, refused to exclude the legitimate government in Kabul led by President Ashraf Ghani. Like negotiations between Taliban and Washington, it also tried to open a parallel course of dialogues with Taliban on the one hand, and with the Ashraf Ghani government on the other. This is how it was getting ready to face the possible ramifications of Taliban entering into an agreement with Washington.
Tehran considers this scenario a threat, not only to Afghanistan, but to the entire region and Iran’s own national interests. It thinks that it will cause instability in its eastern borders where external forces will play a more active role than what they did in the past. This will raise the level of conflict which will complicate the situation for which Iran will have to pay the price.
(by Hassan Fahs in Al Modon, Beirut)
Compiled and Translated by Faizul Haque