Hormuz Crisis Erodes Trust in America

The Hormuz crisis prompted France and the UK to try to fill part of the security vacuum by launching a joint maritime initiative to safeguard navigation under the name Multinational Middle East Task Force, with the participation of around 40 European and Asian countries. The British Defence Secretary announced that the UK’s contribution would include…

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Faizul Haque

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European and Asian countries heavily dependent on Gulf oil found themselves facing a dilemma: they need the Strait of Hormuz to remain open, but they do not want to become involved in a war with Iran. It was therefore unsurprising that President Trump’s calls for NATO allies to help keep the Strait open received only a limited response. Trump warned that NATO would face a bleak future if it failed to assist in securing the Strait of Hormuz, reminding Europeans of American support for Ukraine and arguing that the time had come for allies to return the favour.

The European response, however, was marked by hesitation and caution. European governments viewed the conflict with Iran as not being NATO’s war and believed that Washington had not sufficiently consulted its allies before escalating the situation. As a result, several capitals,particularly London and Berlin,preferred to avoid becoming involved in a confrontation that could evolve into a prolonged war of attrition in the Gulf. In this context, international relations professor Stephen Walt argued:“Washington’s allies have little incentive to rescue Trump from his mistakes, and they prefer to reduce their dependence on a partner that has become less predictable and more inclined to impose burdens on its allies without adequate coordination.”

These positions suggest that allies who had long regarded the US as the principal guarantor of freedom of navigation, trade, and energy security have begun to view Washington as a source of instability, whether because of its escalatory policies or its inability to bring an end to the conflict it initiated.

The Hormuz crisis prompted France and the UK to try to fill part of the security vacuum by launching a joint maritime initiative to safeguard navigation under the name Multinational Middle East Task Force, with the participation of around 40 European and Asian countries. The British Defence Secretary announced that the UK’s contribution would include a warship, Typhoon fighter aircraft, autonomous mine-detection systems, and counter-drone capabilities, together with £115 million in funding to support the mission. He emphasised that the operation would be defensive and independent, seeking to avoid any perception that it formed part of an offensive coalition against Iran.

The initiative, however, also exposed the limits of Europe’s ability to become a genuine alternative to the American security umbrella. According to French estimates, the mission requires at least eight naval frigates, yet participating countries have so far managed to provide only about six. They also face shortages of helicopters, maritime patrol aircraft, and the air assets needed to conduct an effective operation in a highly contested environment. In addition, disagreements emerged among European governments over the rules of engagement and the appropriate response should their vessels come under Iranian attack. Spain declined to participate, stating that it might reconsider only if the mission received authorisation from the UN Security Council.

It was therefore unsurprising that the German Defence Minister remarked sarcastically: “Does the world really expect two European frigates to accomplish what the powerful US Navy cannot achieve in the Strait of Hormuz?” American historian and scholar Robert Kagan was even more critical, describing the Anglo-French initiative as ‘laughable’. He noted that French President Emmanuel Macron had made it clear that the coalition would operate only when conditions remained peaceful – that is, “it will escort ships, but only if they do not actually need escorting.”

Kagan concluded that the Strait of Hormuz would no longer function as it had in the past. He argued that the United States’ role would decline significantly, reshaping regional and global balances of power and prompting allies to pursue their own strategic interests.

[by Ahmad Mawalana in TRT Arabi]

Compiled and translated by Faizul Haque