In a significant volte-face,India has quietly opened lines of communication with Afghanistan’s Taliban. Thisshiftcomes after years of avoiding formal contact with the group and supporting its adversaries during Afghanistan’s prolonged civil conflict. But the geopolitical landscape has changed – and New Delhi’s change of attitude, particularly after Operation Sindoor, signals anew chapter in its Afghan policy.
From Resistance to Realignment
India’s aversion to the Taliban dates back to the group’s emergence in the mid-1990s, when it seized control of Kabul amid the chaos left by infighting among Mujahideen factions. New Delhi, wary of the Taliban’s ideological approachand links to Pakistan’s military establishment, threw its support behind the Northern Alliance led by Ahmad Shah Massoud. When the Taliban regime fell in 2001 after the US-led invasion, India established strong diplomatic and developmental ties with successive Afghan governments, becoming the region’s largest donor.
That era ended abruptly in August 2021 with the Taliban’s return to power and the collapse of the US-backed Ashraf Ghani government. Indian leadershad expressedsignificant concern about the potential for Afghanistan to become a hub for anti-India terrorism.
Alarmed by the prospect of Afghanistan becoming a base for anti-India terror groups, India swiftly evacuated its embassy, shut down consulates, and suspended development aid. New Delhi adopted a wait-and-watch approach, wary of engaging with a regime seen as illegitimate and hostile.
In Sep. 2021, Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla, while in Washington, highlighted worries that Afghanistan under Taliban rule could serve as a base for militant groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba, which have historically targeted India. He noted the United States and India were closely monitoring Pakistan’s actions in Afghanistan, given its historical support for the Taliban.
The rationale was clear: a government born of military conquest, lacking inclusivity and legitimacy, was not one New Delhi could be seen supporting.
A Classified Inflection Point
Everything changed with Operation Sindoor, a covert Indian operation reportedly executed deep inside Afghan territory. Though details remain officially undisclosed, multiple media sources suggest it involved the extraction of Indian nationals, dismantling of anti-India terror cells, and coordination with regional partners. Crucially, Taliban authorities neither obstructed the mission nor objected after the fact – suggesting at least tacit cooperation.
This moment of convergence cracked open the door to backchannel diplomacy. Despite deep ideological divides, India recognised the utility of selective engagement where interests overlapped. The operation, while shrouded in secrecy, became a strategic catalyst – prompting Indian officials to reconsider their non-engagement stance.It demonstrated to New Delhi that, despite ideological chasms, there existed operational spaces for dialogue.
Itreflects a broader shift in New Delhi’s strategic posture in the region, one driven by geopolitical necessity, counterterrorism imperatives, and an evolving understanding of regional security dynamics.
However, the ground realities of South Asia have changed. With Pakistan’s internal instability spilling across borders, and China’s growing economic entrenchment through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), India’s policy of disengagement has become increasingly unsustainable.
India’s policy shift underscores a pragmatic recalibration. It is no longer tenable for New Delhi to view Afghanistan solely through the prism ofdemocratic values. Instead, the dominant concern is now security and regional stability. This includes:
Counterterrorism Cooperation: The resurgence of groups like ISIS-K and their attacks in Kabul and Herat have unnerved regional players.As Foreign Secretary H.V.Shringla articulated in Sep. 2021, India and the US were closely monitoring the potential for Afghanistan to become a hub for anti-India terror.
Followingthe Pahalgam attack, Indian officials briefed the Taliban on Pakistan’s alleged involvement. Taliban Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi strongly condemned the attack during a meeting with Indian diplomat Anand Prakash, emphasising the need to punish perpetrators. On May 15, Jaishankar spoke with Muttaqi, thanking him for condemning the Pahalgam attack and rejecting Pakistani claims that India had orchestrated a “false flag” operation with the Taliban.
Geopolitical Rivalries: China’s engagement with the Taliban – especially in mineral extraction and infrastructure – has prompted India to hedge against Beijing’s expanding footprint. Likewise, India cannot cede strategic space to Pakistan, which maintains deep-rooted ties with elements of the Taliban. India’sdiplomatic outreach alongside Operation Sindoor, underscored a strategy to isolate Pakistan.
It is said that despite initial reluctance, India began backchannel communications with the Taliban in 2021.As early as June 2021, the Ministry of External Affairs acknowledged communication with “various stakeholders” in Afghanistan. That same year, senior Taliban leader Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai voiced a desire for trade and cultural ties with India. By June 2022, Jaishankar participated in intra-Afghan peace talks in Doha via video link – a subtle but clear indication of India’s evolving posture.
Quiet diplomacy allows India to resume limited humanitarian aid without legitimising the Taliban regime. This soft power, carefully calibrated, keeps India relevant among ordinary Afghans.
In Jan. 2025, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met Muttaqi in Dubai, discussing development projects, trade through Chabahar port, and humanitarian aid, including support for Afghan refugees repatriated from Pakistan. Jaishankar, in his May 2025 conversation with Muttaqi, reiterated India’s commitment to deepening direct humanitarian support and infrastructure investment, signalling a “bold move” to strengthen ties with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.
Non-Recognition Stance: Despite increased engagement, Indian leaders have maintained that India does not formally recognise the Taliban government, primarily due to concerns over human rights, particularly the Taliban’s restrictions on women’s education and employment. Former Indian Ambassador Gautam Mukhopadhyay noted in Jan. 2025 that India is under no pressure to recognise the Taliban but engages for strategic reasons, including trade, historical ties, and countering Pakistan and China’s influence.
Geopolitical Context: Indian leaders view engagement with the Taliban as a means to counter Pakistan’s influence, especially given deteriorating Pakistan-Taliban relations over issues like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Jaishankar’s statements reflect a strategic approach to leverage India’s historical goodwill in Afghanistan while ensuring Afghan soil is not used for anti-India activities.
Risks and Realities
This U-turn, however, comes with considerable risks. Engaging the Taliban without public recognition walks a tightrope between realpolitik and reputational cost. Domestically, the Indian government may face criticism for cosying up to a regime that has rolled back women’s rights and democratic freedoms. Moreover, the Taliban is far from a monolith. Factions within its ranks remain hostile to India and are susceptible to Pakistani influence. Any overt alignment could become a liability if these factions gain ascendance.
India’s new Afghanistan approach can be viewed as a shift from “idealistic estrangement” to “realistic engagement”. It echoes the doctrines of strategic autonomy – engaging without endorsing, talking without capitulating.
This policy shift is not about legitimising the Taliban but securing India’s long-term interests. By reopening communication channels, India seeks a seat at the table where the future of Afghanistan– and the broader regional order – is being decided. External Affairs Minister Jaishankar’sengagementin intra-Afghan peace talks in Doha, and his direct conversation with Muttaqi in May 2025, signify India’s “bold move” to strengthen ties, including facilitating Afghan trade via Chabahar port.
In the long arc of diplomacy, strategic pivots like this appearto be signs of weakness. As Afghanistan remains suspended between chaos and stability, India’s renewed engagement – shaped by Operation Sindoor – could become a case study in calibrated geopolitical realism.