In May, Fadahossein Maleki, a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of Iranian Parliament, confirmed that the Americans had accepted 10 out of the 14 points proposed by Iran, and that if the US accepted the remaining Iranian demands, “the ground would be prepared for further progress in the negotiations.” At that time, US President Donald Trump announced that he was “steadily and slowly getting what he wants from Iran,” particularly regarding Iranian nuclear material.
The document signed by President Trump and his Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian consists of 922 words. There is only one clause that directly addresses the Iranian nuclear programme, which both parties that attacked Iran, the US and Israel, considered the reason for the war. This clause occupies nearly 30% of the document, reflecting the importance attached to this issue. But did this clause achieve the strategic objectives for which the war was fought?
Despite the presumed importance of this clause, it doesn’t provide sufficient clarity regarding the main points of disagreement. The term ‘reaffirm’ used by Iran means that it is once again reaffirming that it does not seek to acquire or purchase a nuclear weapon. This commitment dates back to 1970, when Tehran ratified the NPT. The same commitment was repeated in the opening paragraphs of the 2015 agreement with the administration of former US President Barack Obama, who recently stated that the new agreement is no different from the old one.
Available information indicates that Iran still possesses approx. 11 tons of enriched material, including around 430 kgs enriched to 60%, a level approaching the enrichment required to produce a nuclear bomb. The clause obliges Iran to reduce the concentration of enriched nuclear material, but it does not require Tehran to relinquish these materials or ship them out of the country.
By contrast, under the 2015 Obama agreement, Iran had already sent about 97% of its stockpile to Russia. This means that the issue of whether Iran will hand over these materials or retain them was not resolved in the current MoU. If subsequent negotiations fail to produce a solution similar to the Obama agreement, that would mean Trump’s deal is less stringent than Obama’s. Furthermore, the phrase ‘Iran’s nuclear needs’ mentioned in Clause Eight indicates Iran’s insistence on retaining its nuclear capabilities for peaceful energy-generation requirements. Therefore, the clause leaves a number of issues unresolved. It remains unclear whether Iran will retain its nuclear materials or shut down all of its major nuclear facilities.
The deal’s first paragraph contains a commitment to the ‘immediate and permanent cessation of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon’. It also includes the phrase, ‘The US, the Islamic Republic, and their allies in the ongoing war declare,’ meaning that the agreement includes Israel, America’s principal ally in the conflict, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, as Iran’s ally. This represents an American response to a major Iranian demand. It obliges Israel to halt its military operations, while the reference to ‘guaranteeing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon’ is primarily understood as a demand for Israel’s withdrawal.
In addition, regarding Iran’s provision of safe passage for commercial ships ‘free of charge for only 60 days’ (Para 5), the agreement leaves open the possibility that Iran may impose fees later. This would effectively end free passage and contradict the standards outlined by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio concerning ‘the restoration of trade to its pre-war condition’. It also suggests an American retreat from one of Washington’s core sources of power: control of the seas.
Iran may also interpret America’s commitment in the agreement, ‘in cooperation with its regional partners,’ to develop a $300b reconstruction plan for Iran as compliance with Tehran’s demands for compensation for damage inflicted on its economy and infrastructure. Coupled with another US commitment to ‘make available frozen funds and assets’ immediately upon implementation of the memorandum, a picture emerges of the failure of the war’s strategic objectives, and perhaps even of a regional and global realignment whose consequences may be difficult to predict.
[Al-Quds Al-Arabi]
Compiled and translated by Faizul Haque