Contextualising Islamophobia in the Indian context, Ashraf Kunnammal is of the view that in the contemporary context of Hindu fascism and nationalist mobilisation aided by the logic of security, the global paradigm of Islamophobia becomes politically intriguing for at least two reasons: it releases the local contexts from the iron grip of nationalism by opening up local contexts to the decolonial horizon. At the same time, it recasts the critical Islamophobia studies paradigm to be capable of a unique critique of neo-colonialism and nationalism simultaneously.
The dominant currents of Indian nationalism often work to establish the absence of Islamophobia in India either by erasing the Muslim question or by normalising Islamophobia through the secular-communal paradigm. Though focused on the French context, Reza Zia-Ebrahimi’s work describes the politics of denying the existence of Islamophobia in different parts of the world and he describes the denial of Islamophobia itself as an act of Islamophobia. There are three specific issues to consider in the debate on the politics of “denial of Islamophobia” in the national context of Islamophobia.
First, the universalisation of theory and its relationship to Islamophobia in a specific national context is one of the ways in which Islamophobia denial is expressed. A section of Indian civil society has been suspicious of the importation of global debates of Islamophobia to particular contexts, as it displaces their own equivocation in analysing the ascendancy of anti-Muslim movements and logic in India. This equivocation sees the deployment of anti-Muslim politics as a mere problem of competitive communalism among different religious or social groups. Communalism then becomes a sectarian hindrance to national unity that is at the heart of anti-Muslim violence. The structural conditions of Muslim minorities in modern nation-states under the securitisation paradigm – as critically implied by Islamophobia studies – are thus rendered invisible.
Secondly, the selective appropriation of global notions by the dominant nationalist discourse while denying the same political right to Muslims in a particular context becomes another model of denying Islamophobia. When Muslim women wear a veil or a certain dress code out of religious and other reasons, the exclusionary nationalist discourse would seek to raise the issue of non-native and globalised Islam and blame it on Arab or foreign influence on local cultures. Such arguments are hinged on framing Muslim global relationships in light of suspicion and cultural treason, concealing the fact that global and local cultural interaction is a typical process in the world. The nationalist anxiety around local cultural practices argues for defending or protecting locals from global cultural practices because dominant nationalist anxiety wants to impose certain dominant nationalist cultural practices over local cultures.
Cultural pluralism from a nationalist perspective is about limiting cultural interactions in a national context by selectively adopting certain local cultures as nationalist culture while degrading others for being particularisms. The global or foreign connection itself is not an issue in a local context, but the problem is with whom and for what such connection gets mobilised, and there lies the conflict with whoever argues for a global understanding of Islamophobia.
Finally, there is an additional dimension to the nationalist position on Islamophobia denial. Islamophobia, according to this, is a foreign English word imported by “Islamists” – those who try to politicise Muslims – to disrupt the peace and unity of the communities of a particular nationalist context. It is becoming a charge against those who use the global understanding of Islamophobia to speak about the political rights of Muslim communities in a particular context. Moreover, the public discourse around Islamophobia is seen as part of the larger agenda of Islamisation of the political Islamists. However, nationalist fantasies of a homogeneous and timeless national identity – one that ignores the hybridity that has always been central to nations – do not recognise how their exclusive nationalist positions are never completely outside transnational political contexts.
The new paradigm of national security in the name of the “war on terror” made the Muslim – whether citizen, immigrant, or refugee – a suspected figure or a security threat by constructing the “subject of risk” in different parts of the world. The problem with the security discourse after 11th September, 2001 is that it modified the rights discourse of the liberal democracy and the welfare state to make the state of exception or emergency the normal technique of governance. While the discourse of rights was maintained, it was also made conditional on the priority of securitisation – prominently exemplified in the figure of the Muslim. The theatre of immunisation from the Muslim “other” – both global and national – became a dominant political objective of the world order after 11th September 2001.
The Indian state also adopted the new language of security in the name of terrorism after 11th September, 2001 with the support of the global powers to effectively curb the political rights of the Muslim minority and other dissenters of the state. The quest for Muslim political rights or minority rights was abandoned and criminalised using the language of national security. The protest of the Muslim minority against this securitisation in India further intensified the security measures of the state. Moreover, the public discourse is saturated with the language of national security. The media and dominant apparatuses of public sphere speak about Muslim minority politics through the language of security, rather than through frames of citizenship.
Disciplining the social mobility and political expression of Muslims by employing techniques of securitisation is part of Islamophobia in the context of war on terror. The security discourse is aimed at depoliticising Muslims by keeping the Muslim political subject away from speaking about the political rights and collective organisation of the society. The reason for Islamophobia is not limited to the manufacture of prejudice and fear or the cultivation of religious misunderstandings about the Muslim minority; it is about the construction of a Muslim subjectivity.
Islamophobia is a form of racialised governmentality, which aims to construct a particular Muslim subjectivity in a particular direction to racialise Muslims or those who are perceived to be Muslims. After the electoral rise of Hindutva, the racialised governmentality of Islamophobia mediated by caste, community, religion, class, nation, and gender has become so pervasive that direct physical attacks against Muslims happen in India with impunity – especially in the form of lynching individuals and organised pogroms – through the political mobilisation of RSS and its offshoots from cities to villages. Muslim minorities are at a critical juncture wherein the fascist exterminationist logic has become the dominant political actor in India, controlling the state and a whole host of public institutions. Thus, Islamophobic governmentality is rapidly becoming one with a mass fascist organising through movements like the RSS.
How Islamophobia is hurting India’s foreign policy
BBC’s India Correspondent, Soutik Biswas in an article on 8th June 2022, wrote that in April 2020 allegations about a Muslim congregation sparking a cluster of COVID-19 cases in India quickly took an Islamophobic turn. Further analysing the global impact of this increasing Islamophobia in India, Soutik was of the view that though increasing but this tide also had worrisome aspect for the PM Modi, as he has made relations with Gulf countries a priority.
Soutik says that India has an old and deep relationship with the Gulf countries. Some 8.5 million Indians work in the six Gulf countries belonging to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), more than double the number of Pakistanis, the next highest expatriate workforce.
Indians also form the largest expat community in each of these countries. They send home some $35 bn every year in remittances that support 40 million family members at home, many in some of India’s poorest states such as BJP-ruled Uttar Pradesh. Trade between India and GCC countries is about $87 bn. Iraq is the largest exporter of oil to India, followed by Saudi Arabia. More than 40% of India’s natural gas comes from Qatar.
Soutik quoted Srinath Raghavan, a professor of history and international relations at the Ashoka University, as saying that “India has a significant relationship with West Asian countries in terms of energy security, employment of people as migrants and remittances that they send back.”
India cannot be complacent and take things for granted. “It’s a myopic way of looking at things,” Talmeez Ahmad, a former diplomat and author of West Asia at War, told Soutik. “Indians have built a reputation as an apolitical, law-abiding and technically proficient people in these countries. If such offensive talk continues, employers in the Gulf could quietly start moving away from hiring Indians. Why would they risk hiring a potential zealot?”, he further said.
This time Mr Modi’s government, experts believe, appears to have reacted late, but resolutely. “There seems to be an acknowledgement that if these things happen, there can be consequences. Domestic and foreign politics are not insulated. The government has to make up its mind. Does it really want to get into rabble rousing?” Prof Raghavan said.
With this past and present of Islamophobia in view, the comments of the two BJP members would hardly seem out of the ordinary. India has thus far been successful in skilfully isolating the wave of Islamophobia in its domestic realm from its wider strategic and economic ties with Muslim countries. But this continuing controversy has muddied the waters and threatens, for instance, its $90 bn trade with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Diplomatic efforts are continuing to reassure India’s strategic partners in the Muslim world that India is a place of inclusivity. At home, BJP members have been instructed to be “extremely cautious” when discussing religion in a public forum. But these efforts are only meant to contain the diplomatic fallout. This is unlikely to change the everyday trials of Indian Muslims living in Modi’s India.
Farhan Mujahid Chak is of the view that PM Modi himself had made relations with Gulf countries a priority.
First, the Arabian Gulf had been closely watching, with considerable concern, the violent nature of Hindutva fascism in India. More and more, leadership in Gulf countries have expressed concern, now outright anger, at attacks on Muslims in India. This is because the Arabian Gulf is home to millions of Indians, Bangladeshis, Pakistanis and Afghans. Not only that, there are deep historical, cultural and religious links between South Asian and the Gulf region. If any region understands South Asia, it is here. Therefore, it should be of no surprise that the Gulf has finally thrown down the gauntlet. In a pointed tweet, Qatar’s Assistant Foreign Minister Lolwah al-Khater said: “The Islamophobic discourse has reached dangerous levels in a country long known for its diversity and coexistence. Unless officially and systemically confronted, the systemic hate speech targeting Islam in India will be considered a deliberate insult against 2 billion Muslims.”
Likewise, Kuwait lodged a strong protest against India’s ambassador, amid growing calls on social media for a boycott of Indian goods in the Gulf. The Grand Mufti of the Sultanate of Oman described the “obscene rudeness” of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s party towards Islam as a form of “war.” Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) all condemned the comments. In addition, both the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) also condemned the remarks. India is, rightfully, in panic mode.
India and the GCC countries – Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – have strong economic ties. The Arabian Gulf is home to about 9.3 million Indian residents and is a major source of remittances for India. In fact, Indian expats in the Gulf remitted about $49 billion in 2019 – 2% of India’s gross domestic product (GDP) and two-thirds of total remittances to the country that year. That is huge, and considering the economic difficulties India is currently facing, it is bewildering that it continues to toe an Islamophobic line the way it does. Any economic sanctions from the Arabian Gulf to India would have a devastating impact on its troubled economy.
The BJP has long faced accusations of stoking anti-Muslim sentiment in India and pursuing policies that discriminate against Muslims and other religious minorities. In March, India objected to the creation of a United Nations-recognised international day to combat Islamophobia that was deftly coordinated by Pakistan under the leadership of former Prime Minister Imran Khan. But, still there was no large-scale condemnation of India for doing so. Now, the situation has turned. And the Arabian Gulf is furious at this Hindutva demagoguery.
Somdeep Sen writing for Al Jazeera on 10th June 2022, wrote that India is currently facing an international backlash over Islamophobic comments against the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ and his wife Aisha, made by two prominent members of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The BJP leadership expelled both members – the party’s Delhi media head Naveen Jindal and national spokesperson Nupur Sharma. However, the diplomatic row over their comments continued as several Arab countries, including Qatar, condemned their comments, and demanded a public apology from the Indian government. There have also been calls on social media to boycott Indian goods.