Israel’s interest was to weaken the Syrian entity, so that it would not be able to confront it, militarily and diplomatically. In 2021, Israel called for response to the risks it is facing in three strategic areas:
- a) South Syria: Israel should exploit the weakness of the Al-Assad regime and the competition of Iran and Russia for influence in the country as an opportunity to strike Iranian elements and establish relations with residents opposed to the regime.
- b) Northeastern Syria: Israel should develop channels of cooperation, in the form of shadows, with the Kurdish forces and grant them military and economic assistance, and in addition to that build a platform for continued operational activity in this region, to prevent Iranian control over this strategic region rich in energy and agricultural capabilities.
- c) The Syrian-Lebanese border: Hezbollah’s control of the loose border between Syria and Lebanon shows Israel’s strategic weakness. It was recommended that Israel escalate its operational activity in the region and encourage international intervention.
Its policies and red-lines changed to achieve its interests, over the course of twelve years: preventing the production of chemical weapons and long-range missiles, removing Syria from the equation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, eliminating the influence of Iran and its militias from southern Syria in particular, trying to establish the status of the occupied Golan as Israeli territory, and the emergence of sectarian mini-states on the ruins of Syria, extending support for Bashar Al-Assad to remain in power, after his supporters’ favour was outweighed by his opponents.
[HarmoonCenter for Contemporary Studies]
Compiled and Translated by Faizul Haque