According to a source at Arabi Post, the Saudi message is not aimed solely at curbing support for Hemedti (Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo Musa) but is also read as an attempt to block Emirati influence which, in the source’s assessment, is seen as affecting the supply routes of the Rapid Support Forces.
This assessment comes at a time when reports are increasingly linking the supply networks of the Rapid Support Forces to channels in which a regional party – foremost among them the UAE – is accused of involvement, despite Abu Dhabi’s repeated denial of these allegations.
Most telling in this context, according to Arabi Post’s monitoring, is what has been published about the runway of Kufra Airport in southeastern Libya turning into an influential supply hub for the Rapid Support Forces, through the flow of equipment and fighters. This is based on flight-tracking data, satellite imagery, and diplomatic and intelligence sources, alongside repeated assertions that the UAE denies supplying any party in Sudan with weapons.
This background gives the Saudi source’s narrative a measure of “political logic.” If Libya, via Kufra, has indeed become an influential supply hub in Sudan’s war, then any party seeking to alter the balance of supplies would attempt to influence the decision-making centre in eastern Libya, using the least diplomatically costly tools: a message, pressure, or mediation through a third partner.
Pakistan is considered a “suitable channel,” an Arabi Post source says, explaining that it offers a framework of cooperation that can be framed under training and capacity-building – an approach less friction-prone than explicit arms deals in an environment subject to a UN embargo and ongoing international scrutiny.
At the same time, this channel gives Riyadh room to manoeuvre: delivering a “heavy” message through a visit with a military character, without declaring a direct political mediation and without entering into public disputes with other regional actors.
Not necessarily. Even with sharp differences over Sudan, previous diplomatic files show that Washington, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Cairo have attempted to work within a joint framework to present ideas for ending the war in Sudan, while mutual accusations over support for Sudanese parties have continued in international forums.
In other words, the hypothesis of “blocking the UAE” can be treated journalistically as a trend of influence and an attempt to curb supply routes, not as a declaration of a comprehensive political rupture. If the source’s account is accurate, the closest indicators for verification are not “images of new weapons,” but rather:
The emergence of evidence of specialised training programmes (timelines, movements, arrangements, participation testimonies) linked to a “special missions” unit.
Indicators of training equipment and field gear associated with the unit and trainees, rather than heavy systems.
Any signs of a training programme for the 16 pilots (training locations, type of qualification, implementation context) without automatically jumping to the conclusion of an “aircraft deal.”
Any change in the pattern of logistical movement linked to Kufra, given its sensitivity in the debate over supplies to Sudan.
Saudi Arabia pushed for the visit to deliver a message related to Sudan, while the real cooperation with Pakistan consists of covert training for a special mission’s unit and equipping it with its gear, alongside the training of sixteen pilots.
As for the narratives about a “weapons deal,” they remain widely circulated but contested at the level of the “core of the story,” according to the source, and require concrete evidence of implementation to move from headlines to established facts.
[Arabi Post]
Compiled and translated by Faizul Haque