The agreement opens the door to a strategic partnership that brings together Türkiye’s military and technological capabilities, Saudi Arabia’s financial and political weight, and Pakistan’s military strength and nuclear status. At the same time, however, it places the three countries before obligations and challenges that cannot be ignored.
Therefore, the agreement should not be reduced to a symbolic step. Rather, it should be viewed as an attempt to reshape the regional security equation, bringing with it both opportunities and gains, as well as risks and constraints.
The Makkah Agreement can be traced to three key factors that helped pave the way for it and drive its conclusion.First, growing doubts over the reliability of American security guarantees in the Gulf. In this context, the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, are seeking to reduce their dependence on the US while keeping Washington part of the regional security equation. Türkiye and Pakistan, meanwhile, are seeking to diversify their security options in a region whose trajectory is becoming increasingly difficult to predict.
The second factor is linked to the escalation of regional tensions, both in their traditional and non-traditional forms. Conflicts involving Iran, Houthi attacks, the growing threat from missiles and drones, as well as tensions surrounding the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, have all contributed to raising security risks in the region.
Against this backdrop, Iran’s response to the agreement was strongly worded. The signatories, however, emphasise that they are not seeking to establish a military alliance directed against third parties, but rather to build a joint defence framework. Türkiye and Pakistan’s priority is also to contain tensions in their respective geographical surroundings through deterrence, rather than becoming directly involved in a military confrontation with Iran. In this context, it is important not to overlook the two countries’ openness toward Tehran and their roles in mediation and facilitating dialogue with Iran.
The third factor concerns the anxiety generated among the three signatories by Israeli policies in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. The US had linked the provision of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia to conditions that included progress toward normalisation with Israel. In other words, there appeared to be an effort to push regional states toward accepting Israel and integrating it into the regional system, despite Israel’s continued occupation of territories in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon.
From the Turkish perspective, the potential gains appear particularly clear in the defence industry, whether through increased exports, the expansion of joint-production projects, or attracting Saudi capital to Turkish defence programmes, in addition to gaining access to new markets. Given that the three countries already have agreements and ongoing cooperation in areas such as military training, procurement and defence technology, the Makkah Agreement can be seen as an attempt to bring these existing tracks together and strengthen them under a common political and strategic umbrella.
In addition, the new defence commitments could lead to geographical and strategic overstretch. Türkiye already maintains a military presence and security interests stretching from the Black Sea to Syria and Iraq, and from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Caucasus, the Balkans, Libya and Africa. Adding permanent commitments in the Gulf, the Red Sea and South Asia would broaden the scope of its strategic focus and place additional burdens on its capabilities and resources.
Under Article 92 of the Turkish Constitution, the primary authority to declare war and authorise the deployment of the armed forces abroad belongs to the Turkish Parliament. Although the ratification and publication of international treaties fall within the powers of the President, the basic rule requires the Parliament to adopt a ‘law approving ratification’. Nevertheless, the Turkish Parliament’s original constitutional authority over decisions concerning war and peace should not be overlooked.For Türkiye, the Makkah Common Defence Agreement carries both benefits and risks.
Among its advantages are stronger defence-industrial cooperation among the three countries, greater political and military solidarity, new economic opportunities, and the development of a common position toward third parties.
At the same time, a number of risks must be taken into account, including the possibility of provoking the Iran-Houthi front, becoming exposed to the consequences of India-Pakistan rivalry, and the possibility of Israel supporting and encouraging the Greek-Greek Cypriot axis.
[by Murad Aslan in TRT Arabi]
Compiled and Translated by Faizul Haque