In Antalya, as in Cairo and Islamabad, the foreign ministers of Türkiye, Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia had previously held intensive consultative meetings, carrying various layers of significance regarding the nature of these encounters and whether they were taking place against the backdrop of the US-Israeli war against Iran, or whether, within broader geopolitical contexts, they heralded the emergence of a new axis. In light of the many factors specific to each of these countries, Turkey’s membership in NATO, Pakistan’s status as a nuclear power, Saudi Arabia’s position in the global oil market, and Egypt’s Arab and regional standing, those meetings continued to point toward potentially significant developments transcending the geographical lines, whether real or imagined, that connect Ankara, Islamabad, Cairo and Riyadh.
What, then, explains Egypt’s absence from the joint defence agreement recently concluded in Makkah between Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia? That is the first question – one that is not, as simple logic would suggest, separate from a second question concerning the risks facing Egypt with regard to the Bab el-Mandeb and the movement of traffic through the Suez Canal, circumstances that would seemingly require Cairo’s presence at the Makkah meeting.
And, by extension, was there some form of veto against the presence of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi alongside Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman? If Cairo was indeed excluded by one of the parties to the agreement, could the reason be that Egypt, had it joined the Makkah Declaration, would have been the only signatory to the agreement that maintains a peace treaty with the Israeli occupation state?
In this regard, finding concrete answers to these questions requires pausing over a statement by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who was quick to characterise the Makkah agreement in this brief, reductive and simultaneously hostile manner: the occupation state “is working to form a new axis against the two axes: the collapsing Shiite axis and the emerging Sunni axis.” One might also read between the lines of Washington’s rather restrained welcome for any “regional effort that enhances collective security” in the region,particularly since all three countries are generally friendly toward the United States and especially toward the current administration of Donald Trump.
Some may argue, particularly those who are adept at putting a favourable gloss on Sisi’s policies, that Cairo may have voluntarily refrained from joining the joint defence agreement because of a fundamental provision in the declaration, which states explicitly that “any armed attack against any one of the three countries is an attack against all.” Even at a theoretical level, this would mean becoming involved in a potential armed confrontation with the Israeli occupation state or with Iran, since it is difficult to imagine a third country launching an attack against Türkiye, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia.
Another view may hold that Sisi does not need any sophisticated ability to interpret the Trump administration’s position on a regional defence option outside the American umbrella to understand that staying away from Makkah is the safer choice for maintaining Washington’s approval and offers greater protection against the possibility of becoming entangled in an affair whose consequences could be disastrous,particularly at a time when the Egyptian regime is politically, economically and popularly fragile. It is true that Riyadh might compensate Cairo in terms of financial assistance, but it is more accurate to say that this assumption today appears closer to a mirage than to a realistic possibility.
In another reading of Egypt’s absence from the Makkah agreement, there are circumstances that seem deliberately designed to appear hieroglyphic from the outset – too obscure and impenetrable to be deciphered or understood – thereby relegating the issue to the realm of the famous concept of ‘constructive ambiguity’. Yet the underlying facts are not merely clear and evident; they are also supported by numerous precedents, repeatedly tested since the Camp David Accords of 1978, through the relinquishment of Tiran and Sanafir, and ultimately… the recent targeting of Damietta!
[by SobhiHadidi in Al-Quds Al-Arabi]
Compiled and translated by Faizul Haque