One Nation, One Election: A Threat to Federalism and Democratic Integrity

Democratic integrity hinges on the ability of citizens to hold their representatives accountable. Regular elections provide a forum for public scrutiny, ensuring that elected officials remain mindful of their voters’ needs. The ONOE model risks altering this dynamic by potentially extending the duration of governance cycles.

Written by

Dr. M. Iqbal Siddiqui

Published on

September 24, 2024

The proposal for “One Nation, One Election” (ONOE) has ignited a vigorous debate in India, touching on governance efficiency and the core principles of democracy and federalism. Supporters of ONOE argue that synchronising elections for the Lok Sabha and state assemblies could streamline governance and cut electoral costs. Yet, beneath these benefits lies a deeper concern: the risk of unsettling India’s intricate constitutional structure. Such a move could jeopardise the federal framework and weaken democratic accountability.

Threat to Federalism

The cornerstone of India’s Constitution is its federal structure, a delicate distribution of powers between the central government and the states, allowing significant autonomy for regional governance. The crux of independence that states maintain is their ability to address localised challenges. The ONOE proposal, however, threatens this autonomy by enforcing a uniform electoral timetable that diminishes the importance of regional elections. This centralisation risks marginalising state-specific issues, which are crucial in a diverse nation having varied socio-economic contexts.

One significant impact of ONOE would be the potential weakening of regional parties. In a landscape already dominated by national narratives, the emphasis on simultaneous elections could eclipse regional concerns. Many of these parties, which represent the unique cultural and ethnic diversity of the Indian population, could find their voices drowned out in favour of a homogenised political discourse. This centralisation of political power overrides the local governance structures that allow states to champion their specific interests, thereby undermining the multi-faceted character of Indian democracy.

Moreover, opponents of ONOE argue that it violates the federal structure of the Constitution by forcing voters to consider national and state issues on the same plane, which disadvantages regional parties. This could shift the political advantage further in favour of national parties, undermining the gains regional parties have made over the years.

Democratic Accountability at Risk

Democratic integrity hinges on the ability of citizens to hold their representatives accountable. Regular elections provide a forum for public scrutiny, ensuring that elected officials remain mindful of their voters’ needs. The ONOE model risks altering this dynamic by potentially extending the duration of governance cycles, thereby limiting opportunities for citizens to evaluate and respond to the performance of their representatives. Without the regular check of electoral processes, politicians may adopt a less responsive stance, believing they are shielded from timely accountability.

This extended term length could cultivate a disconnect between constituents and their elected officials, obstructing the essential engagement that fuels a participatory democracy. By reducing the frequency of elections, ONOE not only undermines voter engagement but also permits an erosion of public trust in the governing bodies elected to serve their interests.

Likewise, the potential for voter fatigue must be acknowledged. The conflation of local and national issues in a single election cycle may overwhelm the electorate, making it challenging for voters to discern which issues are most relevant to their immediate concerns. The intricate interplay of local issues with national agendas can distort public comprehension, diminishing the overall effectiveness of elections as a means for citizens to express their preferences.

Constitutional and Legal Hurdles

In 2018, the Law Commission of India, chaired by former President Ramnath Kovind, was tasked with examining the feasibility of holding simultaneous elections and, while expressing support for the idea, it underscored that ONOE is not possible without constitutional amendments. Specifically, Articles 83 and 172 of the Constitution, which guarantee five-year terms for the Lok Sabha and state assemblies, would need to be amended.

Additionally, Articles 85(1) and 174(1) stipulate that the interval between sessions of Parliament and state assemblies must not exceed six months. If ONOE were implemented, this would raise critical questions: What happens if we find ourselves with a hung Parliament or Assembly? Or if a government collapses after a no-confidence motion? And what about by-elections – how would they be managed if a representative passes away halfway through their term? These are critical questions that challenge the very feasibility of ONOE and deserve thoughtful consideration.

Further, Article 356, which deals with the President’s rule, might need revision. Currently, the President’s rule is invoked only when there is a breakdown in the constitutional machinery of a state, but under ONOE, the introduction of the President’s rule for the purpose of aligning election schedules would be problematic. Additionally, ONOE could necessitate changes to the Tenth Schedule (anti-defection law), since ensuring continuous governance for five years under a potentially unstable ruling party would be difficult without weakening anti-defection provisions. Diluting the Tenth Schedule would open the door to rampant horse-trading, destabilising governance further.

Critics also highlight the potential consequences of amending Articles 174 and 356, arguing that these changes could alter the basic structure of the Constitution and impinge on the core principle of federalism. Furthermore, proponents of ONOE often point to international examples like Sweden and Belgium, but these countries, with their much smaller populations and land areas, are not apt comparisons for a country as vast and diverse as India.

The Illusion of Efficiency

Proponents of ONOE often tout improved efficiency and cost savings as primary benefits. While it is undeniable that organising elections is resource-intensive, the notion that simultaneous elections will substantially reduce costs overlooks the deeper implications of undermining democratic values. Cost efficiency should not come at the expense of accountability and representation, which are the lifeblood of democracy.

The document further debunks the myth of cost-saving by questioning whether India, with its political and economic stature, can truly afford to cut corners in the name of efficiency. Elections are a cornerstone of democracy, a means to ensure participation, accountability, and representation. While ONOE proponents argue that fewer elections reduce costs, this overlooks the excessive spending during campaigns, which should instead be regulated to curb inefficiencies.

What is more, ONOE’s promise of easing governance by avoiding frequent impositions of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) is overstated. The MCC simply prevents ruling parties from misusing government machinery during elections, and any governance slowdown caused by the MCC can be mitigated through administrative reforms rather than an unwanted change to the electoral system. In reality, ONOE could create more logistical problems than it solves – if a central government collapses due to a coalition crisis, fresh elections would need to be held for all state governments, even where no political issue exists. This is equally true in the case of state governments that dissolve prematurely.

Historical Context and Practical Concerns

Historically, the constitutional framework has experienced shifts in electoral practices. For instance, before 1967, elections were held simultaneously, but this practice was abandoned due to the complexities it introduced. The return to staggered elections illustrated a recognition of the diverse needs across India’s states, affirming that a flexible electoral system permits more responsive governance.

The logistical hurdles posed by ONOE further complicate its implementation. Disparities in electoral rolls, variations in state laws governing elections, and differing timelines render the synchronisation of election cycles a challenging task. Without careful consideration, efforts to align these disparate elements could deteriorate into administrative chaos, failing to achieve the intended efficiencies.

In times of political crises, the rigidity of synchronised elections could further exacerbate governance challenges. States may face immediate needs for elections following coalition breakdowns or instability, and a unified election schedule could delay necessary democratic actions, obstructing timely responses crucial for effective governance.

Safeguarding Federalism and Democracy

The “One Nation, One Election” proposal represents a significant departure from the core principles of the Indian Constitution. While efficiency and cost-saving motivations may be appealing, the risks posed to the federal structure and democratic integrity cannot be overlooked. By centralising the electoral process, ONOE threatens to undermine state autonomy and dilute the diverse voices that enrich India’s political discourse.

Rather than perceiving multiple elections as a burden, they should be embraced as essential mechanisms for fostering accountable governance and ensuring the representation of varied interests. The focus should remain on enhancing the efficacy of existing electoral processes without compromising the fundamental democratic values that define India’s political landscape. Ultimately, a healthy democracy flourishes when the principles of federalism are upheld, allowing for a resonant balance between national concerns and regional identities. Thus, the push for ONOE should be met with critical scrutiny, as it endangers both the federal structure and the democratic integrity of the country.

[The writer is Assistant Secretary, Jamaat-e-Islami Hind]