Questions Concerning Saudi-Iranian Marriage of Convenience

In the backdrop of Riyadh’s own interests in the region and Teheran’s vaulting nuclear ambition, Syed Nooruzzaman critically analysesthe March 10 marriage of convenience solemnised between Saudi Arabia and Iran and writes that the West Asian situation may be back to square one with all the calculations based on the Saudi-Iranian detente getting smashed to…

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In the backdrop of Riyadh’s own interests in the region and Teheran’s vaulting nuclear ambition, Syed Nooruzzaman critically analysesthe March 10 marriage of convenience solemnised between Saudi Arabia and Iran and writes that the West Asian situation may be back to square one with all the calculations based on the Saudi-Iranian detente getting smashed to smithereens if Iran declares itself a nuclear weapon power, taking advantage of the US focus on the Russia-Ukraine war.

A section of West Asia observers appears to be gung-ho while reactingto the March 10 marriage of convenience solemnised between SaudiArabia and Iran, the traditional rivals in the region. What hashappened is, of course, surprising because Riyadh and Teheranreflected unusual bonhomie while signing an agreement in Beijing tonormalise their diplomatic relations. But far more surprising is thefact that China has been preferred by the two Muslim countries tofacilitate the much-talked about diplomatic marriage, especially whena UN human rights report recently declared that the treatment ofUighurs and other Muslims in China’s Xinjiang province virtuallyconstitutes “crimes against humanity”. But who bothers about otherswhen one’s own interests are at stake.

The truth is that China has been approached to play a power broker’srole mainly because Washington DC has deprioritised West Asia owing toits having been badly caught in the unending Russia-Ukraine war. It,however, remains to be seen if the Riyadh-Teheran deal really bringsabout the desired results.

It is for the first time since the US dominance began in the regionwith the end of the 1956 Suez war that a major development hasoccurred in West Asia without Washington DC playing a role in it. Ofcourse, in the absence of the US, only China could play the mediator’s role itdid as Beijing has friendly relations with both Riyadh and Teheran.China has made enormous investments in Iran during the past few yearswhich places Beijing in a position to influence Teheran’s decisions.The Saudis, having no longer as warm relations with the US as they hadin the past, have been tilting towards China for some time, providinghints of planning to shift their financial resources to Chinese banks.

The Saudis and the Iranians are now committed to normalising theirdiplomatic relations, ruptured following an attack on the SaudiEmbassy premises in Teheran when Riyadh executed on January 2, 2016, acontroversial Iranian cleric, ignoring international pressure to sparehis life. There is now the possibility of a new dawn in Saudi-Iranianties, leading to peace and stability in the region. This suits Chinatoo as it is the biggest oil importer from the Gulf region today.China could not ask for more to safeguard its energy-related interestsin West Asia and huge investments in Iran.

The thaw in Riyadh-Teheran ties is also expected to end Houthi tribalattacks from Yemen on Saudi Arabia and Shia-Sunnirivalry-related problems in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and elsewhere. Itwould now be easier for Saudi Arabia to handle any kind of disturbancein its Shia-majority areas, rich in oil and other natural resources.

There is bound to be a lot of savings in terms of financial and otherresources for both Saudi Arabia and Iran. This was the major factorwhy the Saudis had a patch-up in their relations with Qatar too inJanuary 2021.

Iran, which has been faced with a major resource-crunch following theUS economic sanctions, needed to end its open rivalry with SaudiArabia to be able to focus on more pressing issues. The Persian Gulfnation has been passing through very tough times not only because ofits strained ties with the US but also owing to the internaldisturbances it has been suffering from for some time. Besides this,Teheran has been spending alot on supporting the Houthi rebellion in Yemen, friendly Shia politicalparties in Iraq, the Hezbollah militant group in Lebanon, the Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories, etc. Now Iran will not have to botherabout allocating as much resources as it did earlier for its proxies,but it is unlikely to abandon them either.

Likewise, Saudi Arabia, too, will no longer have to be worried aboutits various regional commitments like providing financial andother kinds of support to the Hadi Mansour government in Yemen, thepolitical forces fighting against the repressive Bashar Al-Assadregime in Syria,Sunni groups in Iraq and friendly elements in Lebanon and thePalestinian territories.

In a way, the coming together of Saudi Arabia and Iran may lead to theweakening of the Shia-Sunni factor in the entire West Asian regionwhich has been a major source of tension there. This is bound tohighlight the emergence of China as a new catalyst for peace.

It may not be out of place to mention here that most Arab countrieshave normalised their ties with Israel, but the US has been behind allthe agreements they have reached for the purpose. The latest are theAbraham Accords signed in 2020 between the UAE and Israel, and Bahrainand Israel, accepting the Jewish state’s right to exist as a sovereignnation in the Arab world. The previous Washington-brokered major peaceagreements between Israel and the Arabs, including the Palestinians,were the 1978 Camp David Accord, the 1993 Oslo Accord and the 1994Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty.

Relations with Israel may emerge as one major factor to make Saudi Arabia andIran suspicious of each other. While the Saudis have been thinking ofnormalising their diplomatic ties with Israel for a long time, Iran cannot go for such a course because of its own compulsions andperceptions. There islittle possibility of Teheran and Tel Aviv normalising theirdiplomatic relations so long as the US and Iran remain each other’ssworn enemies.

There is also every likelihood of Teheran’s intentions being suspectowing to its nuclear programme remaining intact despite the internationalpressure on the Persian Gulf nation to abandon it in the interest ofpeace and stability in West Asia. Its nuclear weapon ambitionswould remain a source of major tension for both Saudi Arabia andIsrael. Tel Aviv strongly feels a threat to its veryexistence if Iran does not scrap its nuclear weapon programme.

The Saudis are already known to have expressed their desire to theAmericans that Riyadh cannot remain a silent spectator if Teheran isallowed to become a nuclear weapon power, wittingly or unwittingly. Itis difficult to believe that the Saudi stand in this regard hasundergone a change with the changing reality in the region. The Saudiscannot be expected to accept the fait accompli on the nuclear front asthat would amount to allowing Iran to have the upper hand in regionalmatters.

Iran’s nuclear programme, in any case, remains undisturbed. Teheranhas been quietly working overtime to acquire the weapon of massdestruction after the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the UNSecurity Council’s five permanent members (the US, the UK, France,China and Russia) plus Germany and the European Union becamemeaningless following the US withdrawal from it during the DonaldTrump presidency.

How the Saudis handle the Iranian nuclear reality under the prevailingcircumstances remains a matter of great curiosity. Taking advantage ofthe US focus on the Russia-Ukraine war, Iran may one day declareitself a nuclear weapon power. The West Asian situationthen may be back to square one with all the calculations based on theSaudi-Iranian detente getting smashed to smithereens.

[The writer, former Deputy Editor of The Tribune, is a New Delhi-basedpolitical columnist.]