It appears that Moscow’s comeback, now taking shape, hinges on stepping in at critical turning points inside Syrian state institutions. Russia is capitalising on the fact that Damascus has yet to settle on the final shape of restructuring its damaged sectors, a gap that gives Moscow plenty of room to propose new arrangements or lock in long-delayed agreements.
From the nature of recent meetings, it’s clear that Moscow is moving on two tracks: tightening military coordination and paving the way for an economic role that would plug Russia back into the reconstruction process once it properly gets off the ground.
Russian activity suggests it is using the economy as a parallel lane running alongside its military involvement, an approach close to what could be called “flexible influence,” where the technical and the political blend together. In practice, technical needs become a lever through which Moscow reshapes its standing inside the state.
Damascus, already grappling with a string of energy crises, now finds itself pushed to look for a partner able to deliver quick technical relief. Russia understands full well that exploiting this need can become a political arena in its own right, and that stepping into this file gives it influence stretching far beyond the technical realm. This approach fits neatly with what international-relations theory calls a “non-confrontational presence” – a form of real influence acquired without putting Moscow in a direct face-off with competing political wings in the Syrian arena.
But the million-dollar question remains: can Russia turn these moves into a secure, lasting position inside the emerging Syrian state? The possibilities of internal political volatility, competing decision-making centres, and heavy economic pressures mean that any external influence is constantly walking a tightrope.
[By Malek Al-Hafez in Syria TV]
Algeria’s Support to US on Gaza
It seems that the debate raging today over Algeria’s vote on the U.S. draft resolution concerning interim arrangements in the Gaza Strip is less a product of sober political reasoning and more a wave of emotional backlash.
It’s important to remember that Algeria’s attempt in 2022 to gather the Palestinian factions under one roof was just another step in a long series of Arab efforts to rebuild the Palestinian house on a foundation of partnership. It would be unfair to pin the breakdown of reconciliation on any single party.
Hamas, a political and military force with deep popular backing, was navigating a web of domestic and regional calculations. Fatah, for its part, was wrestling with organisational and political challenges that made consensus a tall order. Still, Algeria deserves credit: it was the last Arab state able to bring President Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh face to face.
What is happening in Gaza today is not an isolated episode. It’s the product of a complex overlap of three main factors:first, the persistence of the occupation as the decisive driver of every trajectory in the conflict;second, fast-moving regional shifts reshaping spheres of influence and forcing the factions to constantly recalculate; andthird, governance challenges within the Palestinian arena itself – weak institutions, political and geographic fragmentation, and a representational system unable to gather all active forces under one national umbrella.
Against this tangled backdrop, Algeria’s position becomes easier to understand. States don’t operate out of sentiment, nor do they bow to the pressure of slogans; they act according to their ability to engage the party that holds the legal and political keys to Palestinian decision-making.
[By Fadel Al-Manasfa in Elaph]
Compiled and translated by Faizul Haque