The arc of Syria’s neighbouring states includes Türkiye and Iraq, including the Kurdistan Region, as well as Jordan, Israel, and Lebanon. A second, wider circle includes more distant states such as Iran, the Arab Gulf countries, and Egypt. The sensitivities of these states toward the current course of the conflict vary. Türkiye, Jordan, and the Arab Gulf countries stand closest to the position adopted by the government in Damascus, namely the necessity of ending Syrian divisions, restoring the authority of the state, and deploying its forces across the entire territory of the country. By contrast, the Iranian and Israeli positions lie on the opposite end, cloaking their hostility toward the Damascus government behind the façade of protecting minorities and supporting their participation, while backing the establishment of entities that fragment Syria and could later facilitate its partition.
Yet a majority of countries now appear closer to the positions and policies of the Syrian government, after having suffered for many long years from the Assad regime’s practices: spreading killing and destruction, turning Syria into a theatre of terrorism where both state terror and extremist group terror flourished simultaneously, and plunging the country into the production and international trade of narcotics. The support of most regional states for the Damascus government is further reinforced by the broad backing it has gained at both regional and international levels. These are among the foremost prerequisites for rebuilding Syria, normalising the lives of its people, and restoring its relationships and role on the regional and international map – as a force for peace and as a partner in combating terrorism and extremism.
The government has made considerable efforts that have helped restore its foreign relations and lift international sanctions imposed on it, though it still carries a heavy legacy of deep internal challenges. Some of these challenges are now on the path to resolution, including the challenge of restoring the unity of the state entity and imposing state control over its entire territory.
The “Autonomous Administration” and its military wing, the SDF, represent the second side of the conflict. Over the past decade, they succeeded in building an organised military force that became the nucleus of the SDF, using it to assert their presence and protect themselves in northeastern Syria. They also joined the international coalition against ISIS and inflicted a major defeat on it in the battles of al-Baghuz in 2019. As a result of multiple factors, the Autonomous Administration managed to impose its control over the Kurdish spectrum, despite longstanding and ongoing differences among Kurdish formations.
The sensitivities of neighbouring states toward developments in Syria are reflected differently on the two sides of the conflict. They have made the Damascus government more balanced in its policies and conduct across many files, including the Kurdish file. In this context came Presidential Decree Thirteen, which included steps supporting Kurdish demands by recognising them as an integral part of the Syrian people, and by characterising the ongoing confrontation as a military conflict between the government and the SDF as an armed group, rather than a conflict with the Kurds as such.
In contrast, confusion and disarray have marked the policies and behaviour of the Autonomous Administration and the SDF. This reflects a failure to manage important files, including relations with the region’s demographic and political diversity, as well as the troubled relationship with the Kurdish National Council. The recent period has also seen changes in the relationship between northeastern Syria and its American ally, alongside negative indicators in relations with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, whose leader Masoud Barzani called for the departure of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) elements from Syria, and for Syrian Kurds to address their own affairs in accordance with their own will.
[by Faiz Sara in Ashrq Al-Awsat]
Compiled and translated by Faizul Haque