A confidential Gujarat Police SOP seeks to prevent violent extremism. But does its operational framework blur the constitutional line between investigating terrorism and profiling religious identity?
Marked ‘SECRET’ and circulated to police Commissioneratesand district police units across Gujarat, a 10-page SOP issued by the State Intelligence Bureau (SIB), Gujarat Police, Gandhinagar, on 1 June 2026 establishes a statewide framework for Anti-Radicalisation Cells (ARCs). Accompanied by a forwarding letter directing immediate implementation and periodic reporting, the SOP outlines a 5-stage strategy – Prevention, Detection, Intervention, Rehabilitation and Monitoring – to identify, intervene with and monitor persons considered vulnerable to radicalisation. Its objective is unexceptionable: preventing violent extremism before lives are lost.
The document has, however, triggered one of the most significant constitutional debates on preventive policing in recent years. On 14 July 2026, Rajya Sabha MP Dr. John Brittas wrote to Gujarat Chief Minister Bhupendrabhai Patel, seeking suspension of the SOP pending an independent constitutional review. While affirming the State’s unquestionable duty to combat terrorism, he warned that if the reported provisions were authentic, they raised ‘issues of profound constitutional importance’ because they appeared to blur the distinction between objectively suspicious conduct and ordinary religious practices protected by the Constitution.
The controversy is not whether governments should combat terrorism;they unquestionably must. Nor is it about the legitimacy of preventive intelligence gathering. Democracies across the world have adopted counter-radicalisation strategies to identify threats before violence occurs. The constitutional question is different: do the operational criteria adopted by the Gujarat SOP blur the line between investigating evidence of violent extremism and profiling constitutionally protected religious identity?
That question deserves careful examination because democracies are judged not only by their ability to protect public safety but also by the constitutional limits they place upon State power. The rule of law requires security measures to remain proportionate, evidence-based and respectful of fundamental rights.The constitutional question is simple: can the State prevent violent extremism without blurring the line between legitimate intelligence gathering and religious profiling?
Beyond Terrorism
A revealing feature of the SOP is its expansive definition of ‘radicalisation’. Instead of limiting the term to recruitment for terrorist organisations or preparation for violence, it embraces broader ideological phenomena: the spread of extremist ideas, attempts to persuade others toward exclusivist beliefs, and dissemination via newspapers, TV, radio, speeches and social media.
Investigating incitement to violence or organised recruitment is legitimate. The problem arises when ideological conservatism, religious orthodoxy and criminal extremism occupy the same operational space. Democratic constitutions distinguish belief from violence: belief is protected; violence is criminalised. That distinction is essential for evaluating the SOP.
The Five Step Framework
Prevention asks police units to strengthen intelligence collection, monitor extremist propaganda, identify radical preachers, observe vulnerable organisations and enhance community awareness. These are familiar counter terrorism measures and, when targeted at genuine extremist activity, raise few constitutional concerns.
The difficulty begins at Detection. The SOP lists behavioural indicators intended to identify those susceptible to radicalisation. Alongside clear markers like possession of ISIS propaganda, extremist publications, encrypted communications, dark web activity and links with terrorist groups, it also lists changes in religious appearance, increased religious observance, particular styles of Islamic dress, heightened concern about international events affecting Muslims and other changes in personal conduct.
This juxtaposition is central to the constitutional debate. Monitoring propaganda, clandestine recruitment and violent networks is legitimate. But when ordinary expressions of Islamic religiosity are included in the same checklist, the operational meaning shifts: constitutionally protected religious practices become part of an intelligence matrix designed to flag security risks.
A visible beard, religious attire, participation in I’tikaf, increased mosque attendance or concern about suffering in Muslim-majority regions are not offences. Millions of Indian Muslims practice these expressions daily. Standing alone they are lawful manifestations of faith. Placed alongside indicators of violent extremism, however, they acquire an administrative significance that risks narrowing the line between faith and suspicion.
From Criminal Conduct to Religious Identity
That shiftfrom investigating unlawful conduct to assessing visible religious identitypushes the SOP into constitutionally sensitive territory. The Constitution of India does not permit the State to investigate citizens for practising religion. Articles 14 and 15 require equality and prohibit religious discrimination, Article 25 guarantees freedom of conscience and the right to practise and propagate religion (subject to public order, morality and health), and Article 21 protects life and personal liberty.
Intelligence agencies may investigate where credible evidence links individuals to terrorism, violent conspiracy or banned organisations. The Constitution offers no immunity for criminal conduct. But constitutional liberty requires that investigations begin with evidence of unlawful activity,not with lawful expressions of faith. That distinction may seem technical but is decisive in constitutional law.
Subsequent stages of the SOP reinforce this concern. Intervention envisages counselling by families, psychologists, teachers and religious scholars; rehabilitation focuses on education, employment, skills and social reintegration; monitoring requires ongoing surveillance, intelligence coordination and periodic reporting. These features show the ARC is more than advisory: it is a permanent intelligence mechanism with structured reporting and continuous oversight.
The constitutional question is thus broader: might a framework intended to prevent violence institutionalise a system where ordinary religious identity becomes an official marker of suspicion?
Where the Constitution Draws the Line
Every exercise of executive power in India must satisfy constitutional scrutiny. Three provisions are particularly relevant: Articles 14, 21 and 25 (with related protections under Articles 15 and 19). The SOP raises questions under all.
Dr.Brittas distinguished objectively suspicious conduct – links with banned organisations or procurement of explosive materials – from ordinary religious practices. He argued that conflating evidence of terrorism with ordinary religious practices risks violating Articles 14, 19, 21, 25 and 26; therefore, the two cannot be conflated.
The concern is cumulative. No single indicator may trigger coercion. Yet when officers are instructed to observe changes in religious appearance, increased religious activity or concern over Muslim issues alongside ISIS propaganda or extremist communication, the practical effect may be disproportionate scrutiny of one community. Equality requires not just neutral language but equal application.
Article 25 is a significant safeguard. India’s secularism rests on equal respect for all faiths; citizens are free to practise and propagate religion subject to public order, morality and health. In the Hindu Religious Endowments v. Shirur Mutt (1954), the Supreme Court held the State may regulate secular activities related to religion but should not ordinarily interfere with matters essentially religious without compelling justification. Growing a beard, wearing religious attire, observing I’tikaf or studying religious texts are lawful expressions of faith. Constitutional protection does not turn on whether beliefs are liberal or orthodox. Only when belief translates into criminal conduct like terrorist conspiracy, incitement to violence or membership of banned organisations, does coercive state power properly arise.
Privacy in the Age of Preventive Policing
The SOP’s continuous intelligence gathering like dossiers, interagency coordination, reporting and monitoringalso engages Article 21. The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy recognised privacy as a fundamental right and held that surveillance must satisfy legality, necessity and proportionality. Those principles become particularly important when preventive intelligence extends to citizens who have committed no offence.
Preventive intelligence is vital, but preventive surveillance must not become perpetual. Democracies require clear legal standards, independent oversight and safeguards, especially where assessments may affect individuals who have committed no offence.
Lessons from Other Democracies
These dilemmas are familiar. After 9/11, several democracies expanded preventive counter radicalisation programmes. The UK’s Prevent Strategy aimed to identify vulnerable individuals before criminal offences occurred. While its objective was accepted, implementation drew criticism for disproportionate scrutiny of Muslim communities and eroding public trust.
The lesson: intelligence agencies are most effective when communities see them as impartial protectors rather than instruments of selective suspicion. Public cooperation is among the most valuable sources of intelligence. Policies perceived to target communities rather than criminal conduct risk undermining that cooperation.
Rehabilitation: A Constructive Dimension
The SOP’s inclusion of counselling, education, skill development and social reintegration is fine. Rehabilitation can be more effective than punishment in appropriate cases. But rehabilitation cannot cure the constitutional problem at the earlier detection stage. It matters little to rights if the process of identification rests on criteria that are not fair, objective and constitutionally defensible.
A document of this significance raises questions demanding public clarification.
- What empirical evidence supports including visible religious practices in behavioural assessments?
- What safeguards exist against mistaken identification?
- Who reviews intelligence dossiers and monitoring decisions?
- How can wrongly profiled individuals seek correction?
- Has the SOP undergone constitutional scrutiny for compatibility with Articles 14, 21 and 25?
These are not objections to counter terrorism. They are demands of constitutional accountability.
The Architecture of Suspicion
The Gujarat SOP illustrates a broader democratic challenge. Preventive policing is supplanting reactive investigation; agencies now seek to identify future risks rather than investigate past crimes. This evolution requires stronger constitutional safeguards because preventive systems can widen the circle of suspicion.
The danger rarely arrives as dramatic legislation. More often it seeps in through operational manuals, intelligence checklists and reporting formats that redefine citizen–State relations.
India’s founders rejected organising the Republic around religious identity. They established equal citizenship, secular governance, liberty of conscience and the rule of law. Those principles have sustained a diverse democracy despite recurrent security challenges.
Counter terrorism remains indispensable, and intelligence gathering necessary. But their legitimacy depends on a simple constitutional principle: investigate evidence of crime, not expressions of faith.
The debate over Gujarat’s Anti Radicalisation SOP has moved from leaked pages to the constitutional arena. Whether through legislative scrutiny, judicial review or executive reconsideration, the questions it raises cannot be ignored.
The Constitution empowers the State to investigate crimes, dismantle terrorist networks and prosecute violence with the full force of law. It does not empower suspicion to arise merely because a citizen visibly practises his faith. The true test of democratic policing is not how aggressively it confronts extremism, but how faithfully it preserves the constitutional liberties that distinguish a Republic governed by law from one governed by suspicion.