I find the comparison between the two namely divine reward and mutual cooperation not just possible but worth considering because both shape how we understand and respond to moral obligation. Though one belongs to the realm of human action and the other to divine recompense, they share a common role: both act as forces that reinforce moral duty. What links them is that they determine how ethical commitments take form – whether through immediate response or through a system of deferred justice. I see mutual cooperation as morality unfolding in real time, while reward validates it after the fact. If we are to make sense of moral responsibility, we have to ask: What sustains obligation – immediate action or eventual recognition? This is why the comparison matters. Both mutual cooperation and reward shape the way we get the sense of obligation, making them not just parallel concepts but two competing visions of how morality is realised and disposed.
Mutual cooperation and reward are not mere abstractions but fundamental concepts that shape the very structure of moral obligation. If mutual cooperation is superior to reward, it is because moral action is not about compensation but about the necessity of acting in the present moment. When I – or anyone – extend help to another, it is not an evaluation of merit but an imperative response to the reality of their condition. The person in need is not a passive recipient awaiting judgment; their very situation demands an ethical response. In offering assistance, we do not measure accomplishment or compliance with external criteria; rather, we act because duty necessitates it. Mutual cooperation is categorically imperative – it ought to be done, irrespective of whether the recipient has fulfilled any prior conditions. In doing so, we affirm the moral autonomy of others, recognising that obligation is not contingent on merit but arises from the very nature of moral responsibility itself.
Reward, by contrast, operates within a conditional framework. It introduces an instrumental relationship between the one who is under obligation to help and the one who requires mutual cooperation, transforming the interaction into an exchange rather than a moral duty. When reward is given only after merit is demonstrated, it risks treating moral action as a means to an external end rather than as an end in itself. The person is not aided because they are a rational being with inherent moral standing, but because they have satisfied a precondition. This aligns with a hypothetical imperative – “if one acts a certain way, then only one will receive compensation.” Such a structure shifts the focus of morality away from immediate obligation and toward deferred consequences, making mutual cooperation something that must be earned rather than something that must be given.
If mutual cooperation is embedded in duty, reward is embedded in contingency. For example, one does not wait for a drowning person to first prove their worth before offering a hand; help must come in the moment it is needed, not after some external condition has been satisfied. This is the core distinction: mutual cooperation affirms moral responsibility in real time, whereas reward functions retrospectively. If moral worth is tied to the possibility of assistance, then human effort is not isolated – it is accompanied, sustained by the assurance that responsibility does not operate on a time delay. Reward, however, acknowledges perseverance only after the fact; it does not prevent despair but merely recognises survival. It risks turning morality into a system of conditional merit, where action is commodified rather than upheld as an intrinsic duty.
This reveals a deeper structural problem. If assistance is immediate and duty-driven, it belongs to a necessitarian moral structure – one where obligation stands independently of outcomes. When “to fulfil what is due” becomes purely contingent upon consequence, it would dictate that human beings act only in pursuit of future compensation. But this is precisely where the problem arises. Consequentialist and utilitarian frameworks reduce the moral worth of an action to its pragmatic utility, ignoring the necessity of duty in the present. If goodness is defined by reward alone, then morality loses its immediacy. It becomes a transaction rather than a moral imperative. Mutual cooperation, however, is intrinsic; it does not depend on deferred recognition but acts where it is most required.
This is also why the Euthyphro dilemma becomes relevant. If reward and pragmatic utility is the foundation of morality, then goodness risks becoming something commanded merely because it is rewarded, rather than something inherently valuable. This leads to a troubling conclusion: does moral action derive its worth from external validation, or is it good in itself? If we take moral obligation seriously, then goodness cannot be contingent on consequence; it must be something that necessitates immediate response, rather than something that waits for later acknowledgment. If morality is not about conditional gain but about responsibility itself, then mutual cooperation is the only concept that truly embodies moral necessity. Duty is to act in the present, for immediate support – it does not delay its disposal.
The implications of this distinction are profound. If assistance is superior, then moral responsibility is direct, engaged, and essential. Reward, by contrast, risks imposing a hierarchy where justice becomes a monopoly of deferred validation. Mutual cooperation, on the other hand, reinforces responsibility, interdependence, and duty, rather than conditioning moral worth on an external scale of compensation. To receive mutual cooperation is to be recognised as a rational being whose moral reality demands engagement; to be rewarded, however, is merely to be acknowledged after fulfilling a function.
Thus, mutual cooperation is not superior as a matter of convenience but it is superior as a moral necessity. It ensures that virtue is not isolated, that moral struggle is not solitary, and that justice is not procedural but personal. If morality is to be purely necessitarian, it must prioritise immediate obligation over delayed compensation. The highest moral good cannot be something withheld until later; it must be disposed of in the moment of need. Reward waits. Mutual cooperation acts. And in the structure of moral obligation, it is action, not mere acknowledgment, that truly defines what is just.
ye ghaḌīmahsharkīhaitūarsa-e-mehsharmeñhai
peshkarġhāfil‘amalkoī agar daftar meñhai
(Saltanat, Iqbal)