In recent years, disagreements between Türkiye and the US have reached their peak. Türkiye accused the US of involvement in the failed coup attempt of July 2016. Tensions then escalated further during President Donald Trump’s first term, against the backdrop of Ankara’s detention of Pastor Andrew Brunson on charges of cooperating with terrorist organisations. Trump responded by imposing tariffs on Turkish imports. In 2018, the Turkish lira suffered a sharp decline, losing nearly forty percent of its value as a result of that dispute.
It is notable that relations between Ankara and Democratic administrations have generally been marked by turbulence.
In 2017, near the end of Trump’s first term, the US imposed sanctions on Türkiye under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). This followed Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defence system, after the Obama administration had refused to supply Türkiye with the Patriot missile system.
Washington did not stop there. In 2019, under the Biden administration, it decided to remove Türkiye from the F-35 fighter jet production programme for the same reason. Despite repeated demands and years of negotiations, the crisis has remained unresolved.
Türkiye maintains close relations with Russia in the energy sector, strengthened by several major projects and agreements. However, Ankara understands that Trump will not allow Russia to expand its influence in the energy field and will seek to curb its exports by imposing sanctions on cooperating countries.
For this reason, Erdoğan emphasised that Türkiye has significantly increased its imports of liquefied natural gas, particularly from the US, stressing that this move enhances Türkiye’s important position within global supply chains.
This opening toward the US aims to absorb Trump’s anger over any cooperation between Ankara and Moscow in this sector. Türkiye is preparing to receive 1500 shipments of U.S. gas over the next 10-15 years. At the same time, Türkiye’s dependence on Russian gas has declined to less than 40 percent, after exceeding 50 percent just a few years ago.
The case of Halkbank, one of three state-owned banks in Türkiye, represents a focal point of tension in Turkish–American relations. The case, which erupted in 2019, is based on allegations that the bank circumvented U.S. economic sanctions on Iran. According to the indictment issued by the U.S. federal prosecutor, the volume of financial transfers at the heart of these accusations is estimated at around $20 billion.
Türkiye, however, argues that these sanctions are not binding on it, as they were not issued by the UN Security Council but are unilateral U.S. sanctions that apply only to the US.
Türkiye’s potential participation in peacekeeping forces in the Gaza Strip remains unresolved. The US tends to allow Turkish forces to enter the territory and believes they could play a prominent role in achieving the objectives of Trump’s peace plan. Israel, however, firmly opposes the move, fearing it would once again support Hamas and its military wing.
According to Israeli media, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has exhausted his efforts to persuade Trump not to allow Turkish forces into Gaza. The final decision now rests with the White House.
The U.S. administration is counting on Türkiye to play a mediating role in ending the war in Ukraine. Ankara is credited with adopting a balanced diplomatic approach since the outbreak of the crisis, maintaining relations with both sides and keeping an equal distance from them.
This approach enabled Türkiye to bring the parties to the negotiating table and nearly succeeded in ending the conflict early in 2022 through the Istanbul Agreement, which both sides signed before external interventions later derailed it. Ankara also succeeded, in cooperation with the UN, in reaching the grain deal in July 2022.
From all of the above, it becomes clear that the difficulties allies face in dealing with the US may be no less severe than those faced by its adversaries.
[by Samir Al-Arki in Aljazeera]
Compiled and translated by Faizul Haque