UCC By2029: Political Timetable or Constitutional Transformation? India needs constitutional equality and justice, not compulsory uniformity

The strongest case for a UCC is that religion-based personal laws may produce unequal treatment and that common rules could offer greater clarity and equality. That argument does not establish that wholesale uniformity is the only, or the least intrusive, path to constitutional justice.

Written by

Dr. M. Iqbal Siddiqui

Published on

India is being promised a Uniform Civil Codebut, paradoxically, not yet one uniform code. On Sep. 13, Union Home Minister Amit Shah said the UCC would be implemented in all 21 BJP-NDA-ruled states before the 2029 Lok Sabha elections. He cited the abolition of triple talaq as part of the Government’s effort to secure equal rights for Muslim women.

The announcement gives the UCC a clear political timetable. But the deeper question is whether India needs one at all, and whether equality and justice require the State to replace diverse personal-law frameworks with a uniform statutory regime. That question deserves a debate larger than an electoral deadline.

Equality Does Not Necessarily Require Uniformity

The objectives usually associated with a UCC – equality, gender justice, protection against discriminatory practices, legal certainty and equal citizenship – are legitimate constitutional concerns. India already has legislation governing marriage, divorce, maintenance, inheritance and other aspects of family life. Where a particular provision causes demonstrable injustice, it can be examined and reformed. Courts and legislatures have done this in the past.

The real constitutional question, therefore, is not simply whether reform is necessary. It is whether wholesale replacement of religion-based personal-law frameworks is necessary to achieve it. What precise injustice is the UCC intended to remedy? What evidence shows that existing laws and targeted reforms are inadequate? Could the same constitutional objective be achieved through a narrower and less intrusive reform?These are not arguments against reform. They are questions of constitutional proportionality.

One Article 44, Several UCCs

There is another puzzle. Article 44 says: “The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a Uniform Civil Code throughout the territory of India.” Yet the present approach is proceeding state by state.Uttarakhand’s UCC has been operational since Jan. 2025. Gujarat, Assam and Madhya Pradesh have moved their own UCC legislation through the state process, while four states are preparing their frameworks. Current reporting describes Uttarakhand as the only one of these state UCCs that is operational so far.

This raises a constitutional question that should not be brushed aside: How do multiple state-specific UCCs fulfil a constitutional provision speaking of a Code ‘throughout the territory of India’?India could conceivably end up with not one Uniform Civil Code, but a federation of UCCs – different codes operating in different states.

State legislative competence and the constitutional objective of Article 44 are related but not identical questions. If the ultimate objective is uniformity across India, should the country not first have a national conversation about what that uniformity means?

There is a further complication. Tribal communities and certain protected customary practices have been exempted from the UCC framework. That may be constitutionally justified in recognition of historical and cultural diversity. But it also demonstrates something important: equality does not necessarily mean making every citizen’s social and cultural life identical.If customary diversity can coexist with equal citizenship, why must religious legal diversity automatically be treated as incompatible with equality?

What Happens to Religious Freedom?

For a practising Muslim, marriage and family law are not merely a collection of social customs. Nikah, mahr, talaq, khula, mubarat, iddah, inheritance and wasiyyah are connected to a religiously grounded normative system. We do not accept the premise that there is anything inherently unjust in Muslim Personal Law that requires its wholesale replacement.

If the Government considers any particular provision incompatible with constitutional principles or otherwise in need of reconsideration, the answer need not be confrontation or substitution. The issue can be examined through meaningful consultation with Islamic scholars, constitutional and legal experts, and affected stakeholders, and a mutually acceptable solution can be sought. What is essential is that such a process should respect both constitutional values and the religious foundations of Muslim Personal Law.

The Government has presented the protection of Muslim women as an important justification for reform, and the abolition of instant triple talaq is cited in this context. But one reform does not automatically establish the necessity of a comprehensive UCC. The constitutional test should remain: what specific problem is being addressed, and is the proposed intervention necessary and proportionate to that problem?

The Curious Case of Live-In Relationships

The question becomes even more striking when the UCC moves beyond reforming existing family institutions to regulating relationships outside marriage. The Uttarakhand UCC expressly creates a statutory framework for live-in relationships; its official portal currently records more than 4.7 lakh marriage registrations and 108 live-in registrations.

For Muslims, sexual relations outside nikah constitute zina; the prohibition of sexual relations outside marriage is also reflected in the moral traditions of Indian religions. Why, then, should a UCC intended to establish uniform civil standards actively create and regulate an intimate relationship outside marriage?

The issue becomes more significant when registration carries statutory consequences for non-compliance. The question is not whether the State may regulate relationships in the public interest, but whether such regulation is necessary, proportionate and respectful of privacy and intimate autonomy. In the post-Puttaswamy constitutional framework, these cannot be dismissed as mere administrative details.

Where is Democratic Consultation?

Family law touches some of the most intimate areas of human life – marriage, divorce, inheritance, parenthood and personal autonomy. Transforming such laws therefore demands more than legislative speed. It requires meaningful consultation with constitutional experts, jurists, women’s organisations, religious scholars, tribal representatives, family-law practitioners, civil-society groups and affected communities, with adequate time for objections to be heard and considered.

That need for deliberation becomes especially important when Shah has linked implementation in 21 States to the period before 2029. The democratic question is simple: why should a constitutional transformation of family law have an electoral deadline? A project of this magnitude should be guided by deliberation, not a race against the calendar.

Uttarakhand: Experiment Before Template

Uttarakhand offers the country its first substantial post-Independence experiment with an operational UCC. Its official portal now records extensive use of the system for marriages, wills, succession, divorce and live-in relationships. But administrative utilisation is not the same as demonstrated social success.

Before other states replicate the model, there should be an independent assessment of its consequences: Have women’s rights measurably improved? Have legal disputes declined? What administrative burdens have emerged? How has the system affected privacy, religious freedom and customary practices? What unintended consequences have appeared?A Government should evaluate a social experiment before making it a national template.

India’s Constitutional Pluralism

Equal citizenship does not require identical religious or cultural existence. Secularism need not erase legally recognised religious diversity, nor does reform require dismantling the frameworks within which millions understand marriage, family and inheritance.

The strongest case for a UCC is that religion-based personal laws may produce unequal treatment and that common rules could offer greater clarity and equality. That argument does not establish that wholesale uniformity is the only, or the least intrusive, path to constitutional justice.

India needs justice, equality and laws that protect women and vulnerable citizens. But it does not follow that it needs compulsory uniformity. The fundamental questions remain: What problem does the UCC solve that targeted personal laws cannot? Is it constitutionally necessary and proportionate? And is it demonstrably better than less intrusive alternatives?