In the shadow of Uttarakhand’s Uniform Civil Code, 2024, Gujarat has now entered the same constitutional terrain. With the passage of the Gujarat Uniform Civil Code, 2026, on March24, the State became the second in India to enact a sweeping replacement of religion-specific personal laws. Presented as a progressive march towards equality and national integration, the Code in fact exposes a deeper constitutional rupture – one that strikes at the heart of Articles 25 to 28.
What is projected as ‘uniformity’ appears, upon closer scrutiny, as a state-driven standardisation that risks erasing the very diversity the Constitution was designed to safeguard. This is not merely reform; it is replacement. And the precedent set by Uttarakhand offers a revealing glimpse into the trajectory such laws may follow.
The Constitutional Balance: Freedom with Integrity
The framers of the Constitution did not envision secularism as enforced sameness. Article 25 guarantees freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practise, and propagate religion. Article 26 secures for religious denominations the autonomy to manage their own affairs in matters of religion. Articles 27 and 28 reinforce this protection by insulating individuals from state-imposed religious obligations.
Over decades, constitutional jurisprudence has drawn a careful distinction: while the State may undertake social reform, it cannot extinguish essential religious practices. Marriage, divorce, and succession, deeply embedded in religious traditions, have consistently been treated as domains warranting heightened constitutional sensitivity.It is precisely this boundary that the Gujarat UCC appears to cross.
Marriage: Sacred Covenant Subordinated to State Prescription
The Code prescribes uniform conditions for marriage, standardises ceremonies, and mandates compulsory registration. What appears as administrative regulation in fact transforms marriage into a state-defined institution.
In Islam, nikah is not merely a social contract but a religiously governed covenant. The Qur’an describes marriage as a source of tranquillity, affection, and mercy:“And among His signs is that He created for you spouses from among yourselves, that you may find tranquillity in them; and He has placed between you affection and mercy.” (The Qur’an 30:21)
Its essential elements – consent, witnesses, and mahr – are not procedural conveniences but religious requirements. By imposing uniform statutory conditions that may override these elements, the Code interferes with the religious validity of the union.
The prohibition of bigamy and polygamy further deepens this constitutional tension. In Islamic law, polygamy is a conditional permission explicitly recognised in the Qur’an:“Marry women of your choice, two or three or four; but if you fear that you cannot deal justly, then marry only one…” (The Qur’ān 4:3)
While the State may regulate such a practice, with the help of Islamic scholars, to prevent misuse and ensure justice, a blanket prohibition extinguishes a form of marriage that the religion permits under defined conditions. This shifts the State’s role from regulation to negation, thereby encroaching upon the freedom to practise religion under Article 25 and undermining the autonomy of religious communities protected by Article 26.
Divorce: From Religious Framework to State Monopoly
The Code standardises divorce through court-centric procedures such as judicial separation and mutual consent, effectively replacing religiously grounded mechanisms. Islamic law, however, provides multiple modes of dissolution – talaq, khula, mubarat, tafveez-e-talaq, fasq– each rooted in scriptural authority.
The Qur’an lays down a clear framework:“Divorce is twice; then, either retain [her] in a fair manner or release [her] with kindness.” (The Qur’an 2:229)
“And when you divorce women, and they have nearly fulfilled their term, either retain them according to acceptable terms or release them according to acceptable terms.” (The Qur’an 2:231)
These provisions establish not only procedure but moral discipline. The State’s intervention here is not confined to regulating excesses; it replaces an entire religious system with a uniform civil mechanism.
This marks a constitutional fault line. Article 25 permits reform of harmful practices, but it does not authorise the wholesale substitution of religiously ordained systems. When the State assumes a monopoly over divorce, it moves from reform into displacement.
Succession: The Deepest Constitutional Intrusion
The most serious challenge arises in the realm of succession. The Code introduces a uniform scheme of inheritance that overrides community-specific laws. For Muslims, this collides directly with the Qur’anic law of inheritance (Mirath), which is explicitly prescribed:“Allah instructs you concerning your children: for the male, what is equal to the share of two females…” (The Qur’an 4:11)
“And for you is half of what your wives leave if they have no child…” (The Qur’an 4:12)
“These are the limits set by Allah…” (The Qur’an 4:13)
These are not interpretive guidelines; they are binding divine commands. The Qur’an itself designates them as inviolable limits. For believers, adherence to these rules is an act of obedience to God.
This has profound constitutional implications. When the State mandates an inheritance system that contradicts these prescriptions, it compels individuals to act against their faith. This is not merely regulation of property; it is interference with conscience.
Theological Reality: No Authority Above Revelation
The resistance to such laws cannot be understood without appreciating the theological foundation of Muslim personal law. Its core principles derive from divine revelation and are therefore regarded as immutable.
The Qur’an makes this unequivocal:“It is not for a believing man or a believing woman, when Allah and His Messenger have decided a matter, that they should have any choice in their affair.” (The Qur’an 33:36)
This principle underscores a critical point: once a matter is settled by revelation, it admits no alteration – not by individuals, scholars, or even the Prophet himself acting independently of divine command. The Prophet’s role is to convey and implement revelation, not to modify it.
Consequently, Muslim Personal Law, in its essential aspects, is not perceived as a mutable legal system but as a divinely ordained framework. Any attempt to replace it is therefore seen not as reform but as an infringement upon religious obligation itself.
Compulsory Registration and Expanding State Surveillance
The Code mandates compulsory registration of marriages and divorces and introduces verification mechanisms involving employers and authorities. While registration may serve evidentiary purposes, its coercive enforcement raises concerns.
When religious acts become contingent upon bureaucratic compliance, a chilling effect emerges. Individuals may be compelled to prioritise legal validity over religious authenticity. The transformation of faith-based practices into state-monitored transactions intrudes upon the autonomy protected by Articles 25 and 26.
Selective Uniformity: A Constitutional Contradiction
A striking inconsistency within the Code is its exemption of Scheduled Tribes. If uniformity is the guiding principle, its selective application undermines both its logic and legitimacy.
This exemption raises concerns under Article 14 and exposes a deeper contradiction: cultural practices are protected in some contexts but overridden in others. Uniformity, it appears, is not an absolute constitutional value but a selectively applied policy.
A Pattern of Persistent Intervention
The Gujarat UCC must also be situated within a broader pattern of legislative and political discourse that repeatedly targets religious personal laws, particularly Muslim Personal Law. This persistent focus raises questions about the neutrality of reform.
If equality is the objective, reform must be even-handed and grounded in constitutional principles rather than selective intervention. When one community’s deeply-held religious laws are repeatedly subjected to legislative overhaul, the exercise risks being perceived as coercive rather than corrective.
Secularism and the Limits of Uniformity
Indian secularism is founded not on the erasure of religion but on its equal respect. This pluralistic ethos forms part of the Constitution’s basic structure. A uniform civil code, pursued without sensitivity to this ethos, risks transforming secularism into enforced standardisation.
The Constitution does not mandate uniformity at the cost of identity. It envisions unity through accommodation, not assimilation.
A Constitutional Reckoning
The Gujarat Uniform Civil Code, 2026, marks a constitutional turning point. It compels us to ask whether the pursuit of equality can justify the overriding of conscience.
The question is not whether reform is desirable. The question is whether reform can be pursued by extinguishing the very diversity the Constitution sought to protect.
For Muslims, personal law is not merely a set of social customs; it is an extension of faith, rooted in divine revelation and therefore regarded as immutable. To compel deviation from these principles is to compel a conflict between law and belief.
When uniformity begins to override faith, the guarantees of Articles 25 to 28 stand imperilled – not in abstraction, but in lived reality. Uttarakhand signalled this shift; Gujarat has now deepened it.
The constitutional challenge ahead is stark. Will India uphold a vision of secularism that respects difference, or will it move towards a model that dissolves it in the name of uniformity?The answer will determine not merely the fate of personal laws, but the character of the Republic itself.