Before the visit of US President Donald Trump to China and after it, the fate of the American-Israeli confrontation with Iran remains uncertain, caught between stalled negotiations and the possibility of renewed war. The latest Iranian response, reportedly made up of 14 points, angered Trump, who dismissed it as “trivial and stupid” after expecting Tehran to move toward surrender.
Instead, Iran closed nearly every door. Tehran refused to retreat on the nuclear issue and insisted that any discussion about its nuclear programme could only happen after a complete end to the war and the lifting of American pressure. Iran also linked the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to the removal of the US naval blockade on Iranian ports. In addition, it demanded compensation for war damages, the release of frozen Iranian assets, and the removal of decades of American sanctions, especially those targeting Iranian oil exports.
Trump had reportedly demanded that Iran hand over its highly enriched uranium to Washington. Tehran rejected the idea, viewing the uranium stockpile as a national scientific achievement and a symbol of sovereignty. Iran instead proposed reducing enrichment levels inside its own territory and hinted that temporary transfer to friendly countries like China or Russia could be possible, similar to arrangements made under the 2015 nuclear agreement. That agreement collapsed after Trump withdrew from it in 2018 during his first presidential term, a move that pushed Iran to gradually abandon its own commitments and increase uranium enrichment levels.
Although Iran continues to say it does not seek nuclear weapons, fears have grown after the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Some observers believe the new leadership may reconsider earlier religious restrictions against nuclear arms, especially as the Trump administration expanded its demands to include dismantling all Iranian nuclear facilities and ending enrichment entirely, even for peaceful purposes.
So far, Trump has failed to secure major concessions through either negotiations or military pressure. The 40-day war ended in a fragile ceasefire that quickly turned tense again, with continued American naval pressure and threats surrounding the Strait of Hormuz. Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu has reportedly encouraged stronger military action against Iran, including attacks on infrastructure and possible operations targeting Iran’s uranium stockpiles. Yet Trump appears increasingly cautious about being drawn deeper into another regional conflict.
Iran, meanwhile, does not seem intimidated by the prospect of renewed fighting. The ceasefire period allowed Tehran to rebuild military infrastructure, reinforce underground missile facilities, and reassess the damage caused by the war. Reports published in American media, citing assessments by the CIA, suggest that Iran still retains around 70% of its advanced ballistic missiles and most of its launch systems. The reports also claim Iran has continued producing new drones and missile technology despite the conflict.
The intelligence assessments contradicted earlier American and Israeli claims that Iran’s missile capabilities had been almost completely destroyed. They also suggested that the Iranian economy could survive months of intensified sanctions and naval pressure, contrary to predictions from the Trump administration that Iran would collapse economically within weeks.
At the same time, the war appears to have strengthened Iran’s ties with both Russia and China. Trade routes through the Caspian region and rail networks connecting China to Iran have reportedly become increasingly important. American and Israeli sources have also spoken of growing Russian and Chinese intelligence and technical support for Tehran, though neither Moscow nor Beijing comments publicly on such allegations.
China, in particular, has tried to present itself as a responsible global power calling for respect for international law, an end to the war, and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Together, these developments have reinforced Iran’s confidence both militarily and diplomatically, leaving the region balanced uneasily between negotiation and another possible round of conflict.
[by Abdel Haleem Qandeel in Al-Quds Al-Arabi]
Compiled and Translated by Faizul Haque