For three decades, an entire generation in the region grew up in an atmosphere dominated by an Israeli narrative warning of an impending Iranian nuclear threat and Israel’s intention to destroy it before it becomes a reality. This narrative, long-awaited to materialise, led many to believe it was mere propaganda, and no one seriously considered its likelihood – until it actually happened on the night of June 14 this year. So, what is the significance of this timing that ended a thirty-year wait?
The official Israeli narrative claims that Iran’s weapons programme had reached a point of no return, with an Iranian nuclear bomb just a step away from existence. This narrative contradicts testimony given by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, before Congress in March, where she stated that the U.S. intelligence community still believes Iran is not currently developing a nuclear weapon.
From another perspective, the Israeli narrative clashes with the significant security complacency displayed by Iranian military leaders, despite emerging indicators of an imminent Israeli attack. Iranian leaders interpreted these as mere “Israeli propaganda” aimed at pressuring them into making concessions in the nuclear negotiations with the U.S., which were scheduled to take place in Oman on Sunday, June 15. Consequently, these leaders took no extraordinary security measures; in fact, a group of them held an emergency meeting, which allowed Israel to target them collectively. This raises a question: If Iran was truly on the verge of possessing a nuclear bomb, wouldn’t its leaders have taken the information about an imminent Israeli attack more seriously?
Many of the calculations that influenced Israeli decision-making three decades ago can be applied to what is happening today. Over the past three months, numerous signs of tension in U.S.-Israeli relations have emerged for various reasons, including U.S. frustration with Israel’s intransigence in ending the Gaza war and Israeli discontent with the U.S. halting strikes against the Houthis, contrary to Tel Aviv’s wishes. Additionally, U.S. President Donald Trump’s tour of Gulf states last month revealed significant progress in U.S.-Arab-Turkish relations, centred on Trump’s adoption of the Gulf and Turkey’s stance on managing Syria’s new president, Ahmad al-Sharaa, and lifting sanctions on Syria – against Israel’s wishes. Concurrently, successive rounds of U.S. negotiations with Iran were a source of Israeli concern.
All these factors led Israel to recognise the urgent need to reassert its military and intelligence dominance in the eyes of the Americans, as the regional power that Washington must continue to rely on. This culminated in Israel’s recent military strikes on Iran.
These strikes likely aim to push Iran into making significant concessions at the negotiating table with the Americans. This achieves a qualitative advantage for Israel from multiple angles, most notably restoring its role as a regional player that Washington cannot overlook in its arrangements with new regional allies. While Gulf states have strengthened their influence with U.S. decision-makers through soft power and financial leverage, Israel seeks to achieve the same through military might and intelligence capabilities. These are the tools Tel Aviv will continue to wield in the coming period to assert its role as a partner in any regional arrangements, provided its efforts succeed in achieving the intended goals of its current war against Iran.
[by Eyad Al-Jafari in Al-Modon]
Compiled and translated by Faizul Haque